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1 INTRODUCTION 
Non-signatory issues in arbitration refer to situations where, in addition to the signatory 
parties of an arbitration agreement, there is another party or parties who have not signed 
any such agreement involved as well. It may be a question of the signatory party wanting 
to include the non-signatory in the arbitration proceedings, or vice versa, the non-signatory 
insisting on joining in on the arbitration. Such situations are often a cause of heated debate 
among the parties concerned because of the basic premise of arbitration: there has to be an 
agreement to bring the dispute to arbitration between the parties.
1
 Typically this means that 
only parties who have agreed to arbitration can be included in the proceedings. As a result, 
including non-signatories in arbitration requires special mechanisms of law.
2
 
Especially the particular issue of binding non-signatory third party beneficiaries to 
arbitration has been flying under the radar in Finland – there is very little case law, and 
even in the legal literature the topic has been commented on scarcely. The lack of 
discussion and especially case law is peculiar, seeing that the issue is not new in foreign 
praxis and has been acknowledged and actively commented on in foreign legal literature as 
well. 
However, this quite specialized yet fundamental issue has finally surfaced in Finland as 
well. A few years ago, in 2010, a case concerning this very question was brought to a 
district court in the form of a shareholders’ agreement and a non-signatory beneficiary who 
was not happy about the agreement’s arbitration clause. A signatory party of the 
agreement, however, asserted that the beneficiary is bound to arbitration. It is the very first 
case in Finland to deal with this specific topic. Another Finnish Supreme Court case, KKO 
2007:18, has addressed a similar issue before, although with a slightly different premise.
3
 
The theme of the thesis tightly revolves around this case, KKO 2013:84, which went 
through the Court of Appeal and was only very recently decided in the Finnish Supreme 
Court. The ultimate question which the thesis will attempt to answer is the same one that 
faced the Supreme Court: is a non-signatory third party beneficiary bound to the arbitration 
agreement included in the underlying contract from which his right is directly derived? 
                                           
1 According to Article II (1) of the New York Convention, a valid arbitration requires an “agreement in 
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences”. 
2 However, these mechanisms operate according to the basic principles of contract law. What makes them 
special is merely that they are designed for this type of specific situations. See infra Chapter 4.4. 
3 The cases will be discussed in detail below. See infra Chapter 3. 
 
 
2 
 
Since the Supreme Court gave a positive answer, the thesis will discuss and assess whether 
the decision was “right” and well-reasoned. 
 
1.1 Background 
Arbitration is defined by its consensual nature – its essence is the arbitrating parties’ free 
will to arbitrate.
4
 In case parties to a contract do not wish to resolve their disputes, current 
or future, by means of traditional litigation, they may opt out and decide to bring the issue 
in front of an arbitral tribunal instead. 
The traditional and most basic form of arbitration typically includes two parties who have 
agreed in advance to arbitrate all their disputes concerning a certain business deal or 
relationship. However, these days business deals often include complex transactions with 
ties to several parties, especially so in the international environment. These types of 
situations also often create complex disputes with more than just two adversary parties. As 
the societal environment in which business is done has changed, so must the legal 
environment that attempts to control it. This is particularly true concerning dispute 
resolution because it has to be able to acknowledge these situations, adapt and function 
accordingly. 
The aforementioned complexities may arise e.g. in multiparty arbitrations or situations 
including non-signatories who have not formally signed an arbitration agreement but wish 
to participate in the arbitration nonetheless, perhaps contrary to the will of the signatory 
parties. In another scenario, the parties of an arbitration agreement (or either one of them) 
may want to include a third, non-signatory party in the process. At first sight, such 
arrangements seem to contradict arbitration’s underlying principle of voluntariness. How 
can it be consensual if one or more parties resist? However, in many cases it can be shown 
that the parties’ original will was to bind the non-signatory party to the arbitration 
agreement, and the non-signatory’s intention was to be bound. These situations call for and 
are determined by case-specific evaluation, as in KKO 2013:84. 
 
                                           
4 See Möller 1997, p. 2. 
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1.2 Theme and structure of the thesis 
“Few topics have received as much attention as the extension of arbitration 
agreements to non-signatories. This results less from the undeniable practical 
significance or complexity of this issue than, as will be seen, from the fact 
that it touches upon some of the canons of arbitration, such as, e.g. its 
consensual basis or that the arbitration agreement be in writing.”5 (emphasis 
added) 
These two highlighted factors form the two supporting pillars of this thesis, the theme of 
which is the relationship between the signatory parties of an arbitration agreement and a 
non-signatory third party beneficiary. The object is to discuss and find an answer to the 
relatively simple question presented above: does the arbitration clause bind a non-signatory 
third party beneficiary whose right derives from the agreement which includes the 
arbitration clause, and if so, on what grounds? The question may be simple, but the answer 
is anything but. This is demonstrated by the fact that the District Court decided the case 
one way, the Court of Appeal the other way and the Supreme Court eventually maintained 
the decision of the Court of Appeal. However, all of the courts (even the Court of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court, despite the conclusion being the same) reached their decisions on 
different grounds. In other words, the question is multifaceted and indeed topical. 
Why is the question of binding non-signatories relevant? In many situations, such as cases 
of corporate veil-piercing and alter ego which will be discussed below, the question 
directly relates to making all accountable parties liable even if they are not formally parties 
to any agreement. As for a third party beneficiary, the focus of this study, it is a question of 
some very fundamental principles. Do the formal requirements set out in the law for 
arbitration agreements and the consensual nature of arbitration override the basic principle 
of freedom of contract?
6
 Do these requirements and principles even conflict with each 
other? Are the formal requirements an absolute necessity? 
The thesis will approach the issue by first introducing the essential legal framework used 
and needed in further discussion. Despite the national nature of the Supreme Court case at 
hand, the topic in general touches international spheres, which is why the required 
fundaments are presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 displays and examines in detail the 
                                           
5 See Stucki 2006, p. 1. 
6 As in the freedom of parties to grant rights conditionally. 
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Supreme Court case KKO 2013:84 along with the preceding District Court and Court of 
Appeal cases. In addition, brief analysis of the cases and background for the final 
deliberations is presented. Fundamental elements of arbitration agreements which are 
needed in the research are discussed in Chapter 4. Topics such as formation of an 
arbitration agreement, its consensual nature, principles related to arbitration as well as 
parties to the arbitration agreement will be discussed. A particularly essential topic is the 
relationship between the formal requirements of an arbitration agreement and the means of 
becoming bound by or adopting the agreement without such formalities. The question of 
binding a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement borders and may include multiparty 
arbitration issues.  These issues, however, even though fascinating and equally complex, 
will have to be left outside the scope of the study or only mentioned briefly. 
Chapter 5 will begin the actual assessment of the case at hand and the application of 
alternative argumentation. The thesis, displeased with the reasoning of the courts, will 
attempt to study the subject in depth and reach a final conclusion with a more thorough 
rationale and a solid legal foundation. The chapter discusses the requirement of written 
arbitration agreement and the conditional granting of a benefit. Chapter 6 directly 
continues the train of thought of the previous one, placing emphasis on the consent and 
intent of the parties involved. After first discussing the basis for evaluation and 
interpretation, the thesis will apply these rules to the case at hand. Eventually, the final 
conclusions as well as analysis and comparison with the Supreme Court decision will be 
presented in Chapter 7, which will also address potential adjustments with regard to the 
current situation concerning the research topic. 
 
1.3 Research questions and methodology 
The thesis in its entirety boils down to the following four research questions, which will be 
discussed and answered chronologically. 
1) Does the Finnish Arbitration Act’s requirement of written arbitration 
agreement create an absolute obstacle to binding non-signatories to 
arbitration?
7
 
                                           
7 The Supreme Court decided in KKO 2013:84 that the formal requirement is not an absolute obstacle. 
However, the Supreme Court did not present any reasoning for its view which is why the question will 
be discussed in the thesis. 
 
 
5 
 
2) Can the arbitration agreement (i.e. the obligation to arbitrate) be regarded to 
constitute an accessory of the right granted to the non-signatory beneficiary? 
In other words, can the right be made conditional? 
3) What significance does the signatory parties’ intention in making the 
agreement carry? In addition, does the non-signatory beneficiary’s intention 
matter? 
4) Should the non-signatory in KKO 2013:84 be bound to arbitration, and if so, 
what are the relevant grounds? 
As stated above, the premise and phrasing of the research questions is relatively simple and 
straightforward. The ultimate question the thesis attempts to answer is a typical “yes or no, 
and why?” However, the answer may not be as one-dimensional. The legal sources used in 
the thesis – legislation, case law, legal principles and literature – are often in conflict with 
each other. Juridical opinions of scholars fluctuate with regard to the question in its 
entirety as well as the smaller fragments used in the evaluation, such as the concept of 
consent and its role in the process. 
The nature of the thesis is practical in essence due to its frequency and major effect in 
practice (excluding Finland, at least for the moment). However, despite its practical impact 
and the expediency considerations used in the deliberations, the topic is ultimately 
theoretical and, also due to the lack of empirical data, the research is essentially legal 
dogmatic. The thesis balances between these concepts employing the typical means of 
dogmatic research, with the fundaments of the research subject being a formation of norms 
as well as practices which the thesis weighs and systematizes and ultimately interprets,
8
 yet 
acknowledging the inadequacy of the theoretical basis and the gaps in the integral research 
substance. The Finnish Arbitration Act is mostly silent on the topic and essentially unfit to 
resolve the question, which brings a strong de lege ferenda notion to the thesis in its 
attempt to observe and comment on the issue, how it was decided in the courts of law and 
finally present and improved deduction.
9
 
In addition, another focal methodological premise of the thesis is comparative law. 
Justified below in the next chapter, the research surveys how the issue is managed in the 
                                           
8 See Aarnio 1978, pp. 52-53; Siltala 2003, pp. 137-138. 
9 See Aarnio 1978, pp. 55-56. 
 
 
6 
 
legal praxis of countries in which it has surfaced more often. This comparison is done on a 
micro level as it only focuses on a specific and limited subject.
10
  As a conscious choice, 
the thesis has chosen to focus especially on common law countries due to the system’s 
emphasis on case law, its capability to remould itself according to timely needs and hence 
its ability to address the issue on a more flexible basis. 
Finally, the thesis employs both horizontal comparison between national legislations as 
well as vertical comparison with respect to both international law and EU (soft) law.
11
 Due 
to the attention to legal literature and influences thereof, the concept of transnational law, 
which ignores national borders and legal systems, surfaces in the course of the study.
12
 
While the thesis does not intrinsically embrace the attitude typical among the supporters of 
transnational law, it recognizes its (partial) suitability with regard to international (as well 
as national) arbitration arising from arbitration’s autonomous nature. Justifications for 
these choices are found below. 
 
  
                                           
10 See Husa 2013, pp. 126-127. 
11 See ibid. pp. 137-138. 
12 See ibid. pp. 138-139. 
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2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
“The practice of resolving disputes by international commercial arbitration 
only works because it is held in place by a complex system of national laws 
and international treaties.”13 
As described by the quote above, the legal framework of international commercial 
arbitration is diverse. It is governed and affected by multiple sets of rules: international 
conventions, national laws and institutional rules. Enforcement and recognition of 
international arbitration agreements and awards is solely based on the system built on these 
conventions and laws.
14
 Without such uniform codes accepted internationally, there would 
be a myriad of national arbitration awards and foreign courts hesitant to enforce them, 
which has sometimes been the situation before the current regime in international 
arbitration.
15
 However, these widely accepted rules create the frame within which the 
parties of arbitration may operate and decide on the process on a more detailed level. 
This chapter will introduce the legal framework which contemporary international 
commercial arbitration is built on, beginning with the New York Convention. The chapter 
will then introduce the UNCITRAL Model Law and national laws, followed by a brief 
introduction on institutional arbitration rules. All of these sources of law affect 
international arbitration agreements accordingly with the choices of law made by the 
parties. However, due to the broadness of the subject of choice of law and its clarity in the 
Supreme Court case at hand, the scope of this introduction on sources and choice of law in 
international arbitration will have to be limited. The purpose is to present where the rules 
and principles used in this thesis originate from – in other words, to provide the basic tools 
needed for the following analysis of the research question.
16
 
 
                                           
13 See Redfern - Hunter 2009, p. 1. 
14 See Born 2009, p. 90. 
15 See Born 2009, p. 64. 
16 Choice of law and its effects in international commercial arbitration agreements is the subject of myriad 
of legal literature. For further analysis on the subject, see e.g. Hobér 2011, pp. 39-78; Born 2009, pp. 
409-561; Redfern-Hunter 2009, pp. 163-239; Lew 2003, pp. 99-127. 
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2.2 Use of legal sources 
The study will contemplate the topic from the perspectives of both contract law and 
arbitration legislation. However, since the issue, as will be explained below, boils down to 
only two sections of the Finnish Arbitration Act and their interpretation, the solutions will 
have to be found somewhere other than the arbitration law. General (applicable) legal 
principles directed and endorsed by societal practices may be used in support of 
administration of justice
17
, which is why they are weighed and valued with regard to 
expediency considerations and employed in the deliberations below. In addition to Finnish 
legislation, e.g. contract law, the study will look into arbitration laws of other countries as 
well as some of the most well-known arbitration institutions’ rules and international 
conventions. Furthermore, since there is not much legal literature or research on the subject 
in Finland, the study will look for guidelines and tendencies in foreign legal principles and 
literature, where the theme has been discussed extensively. 
Since the subject of this thesis concerns a national arbitration case in Finland under Finnish 
law, one could ask why international legal framework is introduced. The reason is that 
even though the aforementioned court decisions are based on Finnish sources of law, in the 
absence of applicable Finnish regulation or case law or to supplement it, it is facilitative 
and often necessary to look for help from foreign sources.
18
 These sources, such as foreign 
laws and court decisions, may often be heavily influenced by rules and customs of 
international arbitration, which is why the fundaments of such rules are presented briefly. 
Furthermore, such introduction is useful for the purposes of legal comparison. Hence, 
international arbitration agreements are used as tools of comparison and guidance. 
The thesis will also rely in its argumentation on transnational harmonization undertakings, 
such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010)
19
 and the 
Principles of European Contract Law (2002)
20
. The principles, which were developed to 
support and supplement the general rules of contract law in international commercial 
environment as well as domestic law in some instances
21
, are used especially in the later 
                                           
17 See Siltala 2003, pp. 138-139 
18 See Hemmo 2007a, pp. 43-48. 
19 See the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010), available online at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf. 
20 See The Principles of European Contract Law (Parts I and II revised 1998, Part III 2002), available online 
at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.parts.1.to.3.2002/. 
21 See Norros 2007, pp. 25-26. 
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parts of the thesis which examine the application of certain principles of contract 
interpretation in KKO 2013:84. The European and (especially) UNIDROIT principles have 
achieved a relatively significant position in international commercial arbitration
22
, which is 
why leaning on them is justifiable in the absence of applicable domestic rules as well using 
them as a supporting source.
23
 Moreover, despite their soft law nature, the principles may 
be applied “by virtue of their persuasive value”24 as well as a direct or supplementing 
source or as a guide with regard to lex mercatoria.
25
 
Moreover, the active use of foreign sources of law, e.g. legal literature, is based on the 
development of arbitration in an international environment. Therefore, using foreign 
sources of law is advisable in seeking directions to support the decision in KKO 2013:84. 
Although some commentators regard arbitration as an area of law or judicial process that 
may be detached from national legal regimes entirely,
26
 or that national law should only be 
taken into account when national interests are implicated, the thesis will not go as far as to 
suggest relying completely on international or transnational norms. Although supportive to 
the underlying notion which emphasizes arbitration’s international connections, the 
complete transformation to a transnational system would in the author’s view present 
significant issues in practice, e.g. in questions of finding a general consensus as well as 
enforcement of foreign awards. Other typical downsides of such delocalization include 
denying the parties’ expectations, disregard for public or private interests and loss of 
trustworthiness of arbitration as a process.
27
 
 
2.3 New York Convention 
Preceded by the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters (the 
“Geneva Protocol”) and the 1927 Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
                                           
22 See Hemmo 2007a, p. 46. 
23 See ibid. p. 583. 
24 See Bonell 2004, p. 6. 
25 See Norros 2007, p. 38. 
26 See e.g. Frick 2001, p. 276; Park 2012, pp. 553-554; Hook 2011, pp. 175-176, citing e.g. Sté PT 
Putrabali Adyamulia v. Est Epices (French Cour de Cassation, June 29, 2007);Whytock 2008, pp. 455-
458. See also Mayer 2012, p.833 quoting the arbitral tribunal in Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding 
Company v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, (2008) EWHC 1901: the issue shall 
be determined “by reference to those transnational general principles and usages which reflect the 
fundamental requirement of justice in international trade and the concept of good faith in business”. 
27 See Park 2012, pp. 554-555. 
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Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) is the most significant convention 
regulating international arbitration. It originated from the need to create a uniform system 
under which the enforcement and recognition of international arbitration agreements and 
awards would work systematically.
28
 It has been ratified by 149 countries
29
 which makes it 
the most important foundation for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards 
and the cornerstone of international arbitration in general.
30
 This is because any 
international arbitration agreement or award is only as effective and valuable as the 
possibility to have it enforced. The New York Convention has created the means for global 
recognition and enforcement. 
In addition to its contribution to agreement and award enforcement, the Convention also 
sets the standards for the written form of arbitration agreements: 
“Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which 
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences […]”31 
(emphasis added) 
Moreover, the duty of national courts to refer the disputing parties to arbitration in case of 
a valid arbitration agreement is derived from the Convention.
32
 These requirements, as the 
entity of the Convention in general, are given effect in practice through national 
legislation.
33
 However, although these basic rules and principles are defined in the 
Convention, implementation of its provisions is at the discretion of the contracting states. 
This demonstrates the constitutional nature of the Convention.
34
 Apart from relatively few 
provisions, such as Article II (1), it does not provide exact rules which the contracting 
states should adopt. Instead, it presents the broad framework of rules within which states 
and national courts are free to operate. This is reflected e.g. in the provisions of the 
Convention which subjugate the validity of arbitration agreements to national legislation.
35
 
                                           
28 See Born 2009, p. 96. 
29 For a complete list of the countries that have ratified the New York Convention, see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited 
31.10.2013). 
30 See Born 2009, p. 95. 
31 Article II (1) of the New York Convention. The cause and effect of the written requirement will be 
discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4.3. 
32 See Article II (3) of the New York Convention. 
33 See Born 2009, pp. 99-100. 
34 Ibid. p. 101. 
35 See Article V (1) (a) of the New York Convention. 
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2.4 The UNCITRAL Model Law and national legislation 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) is 
considered to be the most important legal tool
36
 in international commercial arbitration.
37
 It 
was designed by The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) to “assist States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral 
procedure so as to take into account the particular features and needs of international 
commercial arbitration”.38 The need to create the Model Law arose from defects and 
incompatibilities of national arbitration laws (or the complete lack thereof) with regard to 
international arbitration. National laws were considered outdated and suitable only for 
domestic arbitrations, as well as inconsistent with each other. 
39
 
The Model Law has been adopted in national legislation in some 60 countries
40
 and used as 
a model in several others. Even though Finland has not adopted the Model Law as such, it 
has been used as a model when enacting the Finnish Arbitration Act.
41
 
The Model Law includes 36 articles which address the arbitration process as a whole, 
regulating the arbitration agreement, the arbitral tribunal, arbitration proceedings as well as 
recognition of awards among other things. With regard to this study, the most important 
part of the Model Law is Article 7 (Option I) which provides the definition of arbitration 
agreement and the rules for its formation, including the requirement of the written 
agreement.
42
 However, the Model Law, revised in 2006, recognizes the changing 
environment in international business and also provides another option for the definition of 
an arbitration agreement (Option II); an option which disregards the requirement of written 
form.
43
 
 
                                           
36 As opposed to the New York Convention as the most important convention regarding international 
arbitration. 
37 See Born 2009, p. 115. 
38 UNCITRAL Model Law home page, preface, see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html (last visited 
5.11.2013). 
39 See Explanatory note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, UNCITRAL Model Law, pp. 24-25. 
40 For a complete list of the countries that have adopted the Model Law in their national legislation, see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last 
visited 5.11.2013). 
41 See HE 202/1991; Möller 1997, p. 10. 
42 Article 7 (2) (Option I) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Discussed further below, see infra Chapter 4.3. 
43 Article 7 (Option II) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
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2.5 Institutional rules 
Arbitration may be divided into two categories: institutional arbitration and ad hoc 
arbitration. In the latter instance, the parties agree in their arbitration clause that the rules 
that govern the arbitration process are those decided by the parties or the arbitral tribunal.
44
 
The parties may choose to incorporate their own set of procedural rules or pick from a 
category of pre-existing ones.
45
 However, in addition to the rules chosen by the parties, the 
process is influenced by the mandatory rules in the lex arbitri, the procedural law of the 
seat of arbitration.
46
 Moreover, in ad hoc arbitration, the arbitral tribunal is not under the 
supervision of an institution and the process is generally free of form. 
In the case of institutional arbitration, the parties elect in the arbitration agreement the 
institution under the rules of which the arbitration process will be conducted.
47
 The arbitral 
institution will also supervise the process. It has become more and more frequent that 
instead of using their own discretion to organize the arbitration process and the rules 
thereof, parties choose the package tour of arbitration – an institution with certain rules that 
govern the entire process from the choosing of the arbitrators to the award making 
process.
48
 On the one hand, such institutionalization may lead to a more efficient process 
where everything is taken care of, but on the other hand it is said to lead to 
“judicialization” of arbitration, meaning that the autonomy of the parties diminishes and 
makes way to a process that resembles litigation.
49
 However, this development has made 
the arbitration institutions of different countries compete with each other, which naturally 
encourages improvement of the process as well. 
The most significant arbitration institutions are the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), and the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC).
50
 In 
Finland, institutional arbitration is organized by the Finland Chamber of Commerce (FCC).  
                                           
44 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 52; Born 2009, p. 149; Lew 2003, pp. 33-34. 
45 See Born 2009, pp. 149-150. 
46 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 52. Which law eventually is the lex arbitri is dependent on several factors 
and has been discussed thoroughly in legal literature. However, due to extent of the subject it will be 
limited outside the scope of this work. 
47 See e.g. Lew 2003, pp. 35-36. 
48 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. 33. 
49 See ibid. 
50 See Born 2009, p. 148. 
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3 KKO 2013:84 IN CONTEXT 
As mentioned above, before ending up in the Finnish Supreme Court, the case this thesis is 
based on was heard in a District court
51
 and a Court of Appeal
52
. The courts took the 
opposite approaches to the issue, the District Court choosing the formalistic point of view, 
emphasizing the letter of the law. The Court of Appeal decided the case to the contrary and 
chose to give more value to the intention of the signatory parties. 
Next, the thesis will introduce the background of the case, followed by discussion of the 
decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeal. The decisions will be examined in 
order to determine what grounds and arguments they are based on. Lastly, the Supreme 
Court decision will be examined and discussed.
53
 
 
3.1 Background 
The starting point of the case is a shareholders’ agreement concerning a company called 
MAK-Tekniikka Oy (A). Another company, Jakaja Oy (B) entered into the shareholders’ 
agreement with A. In addition to the typical provisions concerning the contracting parties’ 
rights and duties, the agreement contained a clause according to which a third party, Mr. 
Onnela (C), had the right to acquire the shares owned by B in company A for a fixed price 
within a month’s time, starting on 1 January 2008. In other words, C was a non-signatory 
third party beneficiary with a redemption right in relation to B. Furthermore, the agreement 
included an arbitration clause under which all disagreements arising out of the agreement 
shall be solved in arbitration. The arbitration clause was drafted in a general manner and 
did not specify any parties. 
Despite C’s redemption right, B sold the shares in question to another outside party even 
though C had made a claim for redemption of the shares. Therefore, C filed a claim in the 
District Court of Satakunta, alleging a breach of the shareholders’ agreement and his rights 
under the agreement. 
                                           
51 District Court of Satakunta, L 10/5022. 
52 The Court of Appeal of Vaasa, S 10/1479. 
53 The decisions of all instances are summarized in the Supreme Court decision, available online at 
http://www.kko.fi/63703.htm. However, the thesis uses the decisions in their entirety as a source. 
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B replied to the claim, asserting as a procedural objection that C could not bring the case to 
a court but must commence arbitration proceedings instead. B argued that C, whose right 
of redemption directly derived from the shareholders’ agreement, was bound to the 
incorporated arbitration agreement as well. According to B, C as a third party could not be 
granted a better right than what was granted to A and B. In this case, the better right meant 
the right to choose the forum, court or arbitration, where to file his claim. Therefore, the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction. In addition, B referred to section 4 of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act, under which “arbitration clauses in wills, deeds of gift, bills of lading or 
similar documents, in the bylaws of an association, of a foundation, of a limited liability 
company or of another company or corporate entity and by which the parties or the person 
against whom a claim is made are bound, shall have the same effect as arbitration 
agreements.”54 B claimed that granting the redemption right to C in the shareholders’ 
agreement was a unilateral stipulation similar to the stipulations mentioned in section 4 of 
the Finnish Arbitration Act, and therefore the formal requirements of an arbitration 
agreement were fulfilled. 
C on the other hand argued that he was not bound by the arbitration clause included in the 
underlying agreement. C referred to section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act, under which 
an arbitration agreement must be made in writing. According to C, the fact that he had not 
signed the shareholders’ agreement but was merely a third party beneficiary meant that he 
was not bound by the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, C stated that in case A and B 
had wanted to include C in the arbitration clause, they would have had the option to 
include such provision in the agreement. C also claimed that had it been A and B’s 
intention, they would have included such provision. It is also noteworthy to point out C’s 
argument that even if A and B had intended to include C, their mere intention was not 
enough to create such binding obligation. 
 
3.2 District Court of Satakunta 
The District Court of Satakunta as the court of first instance emphasized the fact that C was 
not a party to the shareholders’ agreement and had not signed the agreement. The District 
Court interpreted section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act narrowly and underlined the 
                                           
54 Section 4 of the Finnish Arbitration Act (translation, see Paulsson 1984, Annex I of the Finland Chapter, 
p. 1). 
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letter of the law, requiring that an express written consent be made by C in order for him to 
be bound by the arbitration clause. In addition, the District Court supported this sentiment 
by noting that the contracting parties would have had the possibility to bind C by including 
a provision expressly stating so. In conclusion, the District Court found that C was not 
bound by the arbitration clause. 
 
3.3 The Court of Appeal of Vaasa 
The Court of Appeal began by referring to both section 4 of the Finnish Arbitration Act 
and the District Court ruling, stating that an arbitration agreement may bind a non-
signatory third party. However, it concluded that in this case, section 4 of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act did not apply because the shareholders’ agreement in question was not 
comparable to the documents of section 4. 
The Court of Appeal also referred to the Supreme Court precedent KKO 2007:18, in which 
the Supreme Court decided on a dispute concerning a non-signatory beneficiary’s right of 
first refusal. However, the case was decisively different because the arbitration agreement 
in question expressly stated that all disputes arising in connection with the right of first 
refusal shall be settled in arbitration, whereas in the case at hand the arbitration clause is a 
general one with no such specific stipulations. 
The District Court in its decision settled for examining whether the formal requirements of 
the arbitration agreement were fulfilled, whereas the Court of Appeal took a different 
approach to the issue. It reasoned that the case was not about A and B creating obligations 
to a non-signatory party, which, plainly put, is not possible according to the fundaments of 
contract law.
55
 It stated that even though the shareholders’ agreement was not binding on 
C, the signatory parties had the right to freely determine the conditions under which they 
were bound in relation to C – in other words, the terms which C had to accept in order to 
be able to invoke his redemption right. The Court of Appeal found that despite the fact that 
A and B failed to mention their purpose of binding C in the arbitration clause, the wording 
and content of the agreement as a whole indicated that binding him as well was in fact their 
purpose. This way the Court of Appeal dismissed the District Court’s position that an 
express written statement binding C had to be made. 
                                           
55 See Hemmo 2007c, pp. 58-59. 
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The Court of Appeal also noted that, since the shareholders’ agreement from which C’s 
redemption right was derived stated that all the disputes arising from it must be settled in 
arbitration and C based his claim directly and exclusively on a breach of this agreement, C 
must also be bound by the arbitration clause. 
 
3.4 The Supreme Court  
The two court decisions above set the background for the analysis of the Supreme Court. 
The first question to be considered, probably the most pivotal concerning the end result, 
was whether the District Court was wrong in concluding that section 3 of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act creates a peremptory obstacle to extending the arbitration clause to non-
signatories. The Court of Appeal seemed to think so, but in its reasoning it failed to 
mention on what grounds exactly the requirement of written agreement was bypassed. 
In its decision KKO 2013:84, released on 13 November 2013, the Supreme Court first 
went through the factual background of the case, then moving to state the applicable 
provisions of law, sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Finnish Arbitration Act. The court also took 
notice on the aforementioned precedent KKO 2007:18 as well as KKO 1990:116, which 
related to ambiguity of the arbitration clause and the fact that the claim was not based on a 
breach of the underlying agreement. As for KKO 2007:18, the court underlined that the 
dispute and claim in question were based on the underlying agreement, which contained 
the arbitration clause, and its interpretation. 
In KKO 2013:84, the Supreme Court refers to a number of facts which support the view 
that the non-signatory beneficiary C would not be bound to arbitration. First of all, C was 
not a party of the underlying agreement containing the arbitration clause. Secondly, the 
court plainly stated that C had not made a written arbitration agreement as required by 
section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act. Additionally, the court mentioned that, 
accordingly with the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeal, section 4 of 
the Finnish Arbitration Act was not applicable in this case. Neither had C become a party 
to the arbitration agreement as the assignee or directly under the law. 
All of these factors, as the Supreme Court directly stated, would seem to point to the 
conclusion that C was not bound by the arbitration agreement. However, the court decided 
to rely on other factors instead. 
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The fact that C’s claim directly derived from the shareholders’ agreement between A and B 
was given great significance. The Supreme Court stated that because C’s claim for 
damages was based on a breach of the underlying shareholders’ agreement, resolving the 
case “calls for application and interpretation of the underlying agreement and the right to 
purchase shares contained therein”. Due to this and the fact that the dispute arose from the 
shareholders’ agreement, which was within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the 
court concluded that the dispute must be settled in arbitration. 
 
3.5 Brief analysis 
Regardless of being the “right” decision in the author’s opinion, the decision of the 
Supreme Court is peculiar and problematic. First of all, the dismissal without further 
explanation of the factors supporting the opposite conclusion (C not being bound) is 
interesting, to say the least. The court clearly had the view that the absolute formal 
requirement of section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act is no longer absolute nor as 
essential as it has been before. However, the fact that no further grounds or explanation for 
this view was presented suggests that the Supreme Court took a shortcut in its construction 
of the decision. After all, it was the very reason why the District Court dismissed the case 
in the first place. 
Secondly, the Court of Appeal’s rationale for binding C to arbitration was based on the 
signatory parties’ power to grant the non-signatory beneficiary’s right conditionally. This 
view was based on the freedom of contract. However, the fact that the Supreme Court gave 
no thought (or at least no mention) to the reasoning of the Court of Appeal is peculiar and 
leaves open the question whether such conditional granting of rights was valid with regard 
to the arbitration clause (or vice versa). 
Moreover, in addition to the requirement of written form, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
general failed to mention any grounds for dismissing the facts presented by the Supreme 
Court itself which supported not extending the arbitration clause to bind C. Neither did the 
court present the logic behind binding a non-signatory (in particular) to the arbitration, at 
least when it comes to the fundamental requirement of agreement and consent. No mention 
was given to the intentions of the parties either. Instead, the Supreme Court’s decision 
seems to present a new rule of interpretation: in case resolving a dispute necessitates 
interpretation of an agreement which contains a valid (in relation to the signatory parties – 
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obviously the validity with regard to non-signatories carries no significance) arbitration 
clause, the dispute must be settled in arbitration regardless of whether the claimant is a 
party to that agreement or not. 
There are certain substantial difficulties to this new point of view and the rule of 
interpretation it offers (or, more likely, imposes). The lack of reasoning to support it as 
well as the difficulty in its application due to that exact reason makes it remarkably 
dubious for any administrator of justice to use, be it a court or an arbitral tribunal. Directly 
applied to practice, the rule would bypass the subjective dimension of arbitration 
agreements and their relation to outside parties which has traditionally played a major role 
in such considerations. However, this subject will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 
7 along with conclusions. It is necessary to first go through the alternative way of viewing 
the case and only afterwards juxtapose the construction of the case and the method of 
interpretation with the Supreme Court decision. 
The thesis will next turn to alternative ways of resolving the issue decided by the Supreme 
Court. It will first discuss general rules and principles concerning arbitration agreements in 
order to set the background for interpretation of the arbitration agreement in question. 
After the basic elements of arbitration agreements have been established, it will move on to 
apply these rules and principles to the case at hand, after which the conclusion will be 
compared with the Supreme Court decision. However, the precedent will be kept on the 
background the whole time as a tool of comparison. 
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4 ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
In order to discuss whether a particular arbitration agreement is valid and binding in 
relation to a non-signatory beneficiary, it must first be established what is typically 
required from an arbitration agreement. This chapter discusses the requirements of getting 
bound to arbitration: arbitration agreements in general, their formation, validity and scope. 
Special attention will be paid to the requirement of written form which is in the heart of the 
thesis. It is a necessity enacted in international conventions and most national laws, but is it 
absolute or can it be bypassed by navigating with interpretation of these laws and 
contracts? Is the requirement meant to govern matters with regard to non-signatories in the 
first place? 
Moreover, the chapter will address the subject of parties to arbitration. There are typically 
only two parties involved, but as explained above, complex (or not) business deals 
nowadays may often include several parties, e.g. in the form of multiple subcontractors. 
Furthermore, even though the signature of the parties of a contract subjecting disputes to 
arbitration is often considered an absolute prerequisite and premise of arbitration 
proceedings, binding the signatory parties only
56
, it is also generally accepted that non-
signatories may be bound to arbitration as well without any such signature.
57
 The 
aforementioned “special mechanisms of law”, used to determine whether such third parties 
are bound or not, are in fact not that special but result from general principles of contract 
law. However, due to the nature of arbitration as a surrogate of litigation, special 
considerations are needed when making such determinations. 
 
4.1 Overview of arbitration agreements 
The Finnish Arbitration Act indirectly provides the definition of arbitration agreement in 
its section 2: 
“Any dispute in a civil or commercial matter which can be settled by 
agreement between the parties may be referred for final decision by one or 
more arbitrators. It may also be agreed that such disputes, which in the future 
arise from a particular legal relationship specified in the agreement, shall be 
                                           
56 See Born 2009, p. 1133. 
57 See e.g. Ibid., p. 1133, 1137; Lew 2003, pp. 146-147, Gaillard-Savage 1999, pp. 280-281. 
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finally decided by one or more arbitrators, unless otherwise provided in 
statutory law.”58 
The provision makes the distinction between two types of arbitration agreements: 
arbitration clauses and submission agreements. The former is defined as an agreement to 
subject all future disputes related to the underlying contract to arbitration, whereas 
submission agreements are made when a dispute between the parties has already arisen. 
Submission agreements and their formation may be significantly different from that of 
arbitration clauses because it is likely there are hostilities between the parties (as the 
dispute already exists), the nature and scope of the dispute is already known to them and 
they might have conflicting interests in choosing the appropriate forum (arbitration in 
relation to litigation) or the timeliness required (one party may want to delay the process 
for as long as possible).
59
 However, in KKO 2013:84 the agreement was in the form of an 
arbitration clause, concerning future disputes. Therefore, submission agreements will be 
delimited and the thesis will concentrate on discussing arbitration clauses only (although 
naturally both types of agreements are sometimes congruent). 
As stated above, Finland has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in its national 
legislation
60
, but it was used as a model when enacting the revision of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act in 1991.
61
 In addition to the Model Law, the provisions of the New York 
Convention were used as well, especially concerning the definition and the requirement of 
agreement in writing when enacting the law.
62
 
As stated in the New York Convention: 
“Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which 
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which 
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable 
of settlement by arbitration.”63 
                                           
58 See Section 2 of the Finnish Arbitration Act (translation, see Paulsson 1984, Annex I of the Finland 
Chapter, p. 1). 
59 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 121. 
60 See supra note 40. 
61 See HE 202/1991. 
62 See Ibid. 
63 See Article II (1) of the New York Convention. 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law provides a definition of arbitration agreement almost 
identical to the one above.
64
 
As may be distinguished from the definition, there are certain substantial characteristics to 
arbitration agreements in addition to the written form and the separation of arbitration 
clauses and submission agreements. First of all, a defined legal relationship between the 
parties is necessary. However, it does not have to be contractual, as, for instance, tortuous 
liability.
65
 Moreover, it may be real or implied
66
 – a fact which is important in the case 
KKO 2013:84 due to the lack of any such original contractual relationship between the 
signatories and the non-signatory party. 
Moreover, the subject matter of the dispute must be “capable of settlement by 
arbitration”. This requirement refers to the substantive validity of the agreement. It is 
similar and may be confused with the non-arbitrability doctrine. On the basis of the 
former, an arbitration agreement may be challenged e.g. by invoking fraud or duress or 
other grounds of contract law.67 Non-arbitrability refers to situations where the subject 
matter of the dispute belongs to a category of issues which are considered to be non-
arbitrable, i.e. specific reasons dictate such disputes to be brought to normal litigation.68 
However, non-arbitrability relates to the nullity of arbitration awards, and therefore 
does not concern the thesis and will be left out of the scope of this work.69 
Finally, arbitration agreements are almost universally (including in Finland) considered to 
be “separable” from the underlying agreement.70 
“The arbitral clause is autonomous and juridically independent from the main 
contract in which it is contained”71 
                                           
64 See Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
65 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 93. 
66 See Ibid. 
67 See Born 2009, p. 705. 
68 See Lew 2003, p. 129-130; Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 94-95. 
69 For further reading on the subject of arbitrability, see e.g. Mistelis-Brekoulakis 2009. 
70 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. 197; Möller 1997, p. 28; see also Born 2009, p. 312; Kurkela-Uoti 1995, p. 
28. 
71 See Born 2009, p. 312, referring to Final Award in ICC Case No. 8938, XXIVa Y.B. Comm. Arb. 174, 176 
(1999). 
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The separability doctrine, also referred to as autonomy of the agreement, defines the 
independent nature of the arbitration agreement with regard to the underlying agreement in 
which the arbitration clause is included.
72
 The doctrine has been adopted universally, 
including in Finland.
73
 According to the doctrine, even if the underlying “main” contract is 
invalid, it does not result in the invalidity of the arbitration agreement. The purpose of the 
separability doctrine is to ensure that the purpose of the parties to bring all disputes to 
arbitration is secured, and mistakes such as those leading to formal invalidity of the 
underlying agreement do not create an obstacle to arbitration.
74
 Separability also provides 
for the basis of the arbitrators’ competence to rule on their own jurisdiction.75 Moreover, 
the question of separability may arise when contemplating party consent. It is possible that 
a court or an arbitral tribunal concludes that a party has given assent to the underlying 
agreement but has not assented to the arbitration agreement.
76
 
 
4.2 Scope of the agreement 
“Arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to 
resolve those disputes--but only those disputes--that the parties have agreed 
to submit to arbitration.”77 
Seeing how arbitration is first and foremost a tool of consensual nature established and 
governed by the arbitration agreement, parties are able to agree on a myriad of things. Due 
to this variety of options and the “tabula rasa” before the parties, it is equally important 
that, in addition to the agreement itself, the parties agree on the limits of the agreement. 
These limits constitute the scope of the agreement, and to be able to bring the dispute to 
arbitration, it has to fall within this scope.
78
 The issue of scope also often raises questions 
                                           
72 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 117. 
73 See Möller 1997, pp. 28-29; see also KKO 1988:55, KKO 1996:61 
74 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 117. 
75 See Koulu 2008, p.72; see also infra note 79. 
76 See Born 2009, p. 662; Samuel-Currat 1989, p. 174. 
77 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
78 See Born 2019, pp. 39-40; Redfern-Hunter 2009, pp. 106-107. 
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concerning competence-competence
79
 and choice of law, and is often invoked alongside 
with questions related to the existence, validity and legality of the arbitration agreement.
80
 
The provisions of the Finnish Arbitration Act concerning scope of the agreement are found 
in the suspension of litigation in disputes subjected to arbitration
81
 as well as in the 
grounds for setting aside an award based on arbitrators exceeding their jurisdiction.
82
 Such 
situation would arise in case arbitrators addressed and decided a dispute which did not fit 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Grounds for non-recognition of an award 
with the same rationale are found in the New York Convention, under which recognition 
and enforcement of “a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration” may be refused.83 Similar provisions are found in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in the form of suspension of litigation
84
 as well as non-
recognition
85
 and annulment
86
 of an award. 
The question of scope determines which issues are meant to be heard in the arbitration 
proceedings. For example, the question may be whether the arbitration clause only covers 
contractual claims or non-contractual claims, such as torts, as well.
87
 The scope is typically 
assessed using the language and wording of the agreement.
88
 However, especially in 
general arbitration clauses, the language may be ambiguous and constructed with the 
intention of including all possible disputes. In these situations, the scope is determined by 
means of contract interpretation, often using general principles of national contract law.
89
 
                                           
79 The question of competence-competence (kompetenz kompetenz, competence de competence) refers to 
the arbitral tribunal’s competence to decide whether the dispute at hand is in fact within their 
jurisdiction. Questions such as validity, legality and existence of the arbitration agreement fall within 
these considerations, which are internationally regarded to be up for arbitral tribunals to determine. 
However, such jurisdictional questions are not relevant for the purposes of this work and will be left 
outside further discussion. For further analysis on competence-competence, see e.g. Kröll-Mistelis 2011, 
pp. 157-178; Born 2009, pp. 851-1001; Gaillard-Savage 1999, pp. 395-401; Koulu 2008, p. 72; 
Kurkela-Uoti 1995, p. 70; Karrer – Kälin-Nauer 1996, pp. 31-37. 
80 See Bermann 2012, p. 37. 
81 See Section 5 (1) of the Finnish Arbitration Act. 
82 See Section 41 (1) of the Finnish Arbitration Act. 
83 See Article V (1) of the New York Convention. 
84 See Article 8 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
85 See Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
86 See Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
87 See Born 2009, pp. 1059-1060; Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 107. 
88 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 107; Born 2009, p. 1060. 
89 See Born 2009, p. 1063. 
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The relevance of the scope of the agreement is significant. In case the agreement only 
subjects certain specific categories of disputes to arbitration, the parties take the risk of 
having to deal with separate processes in both arbitration and litigation. The importance of 
the scope is demonstrated in the aforementioned Finnish Supreme Court precedent KKO 
2007:18 which is closely related to the recent case KKO 2013:84. In KKO 2007:18, the 
court found that the arbitration clause was binding on the non-signatory party because of 
the wording of the clause. No extensive interpretation of intentions was needed because the 
clause expressly subjected to arbitration all disputes relating to or arising out of the 
particular issue of redemption right concerning real estate. In KKO 2013:84, however, the 
arbitration clause was worded more widely and in a general manner (subjecting all disputes 
related to or arising out of the agreement to arbitration), in which case the importance of 
contract interpretation, especially concerning the intentions of the parties, is emphasized. 
Some general rules concerning such interpretation are presented below, and their 
application in KKO 2013:84 is discussed in chapter 6. 
 
4.3 Formal requirements 
In Finland, the form of contract typically rests upon the parties’ determination. Any 
requirements in form are therefore exceptions, usually with the purpose of facilitating 
issues of proof.
90
 However, as mentioned above
91
, the New York Convention lays out 
certain requirements for arbitration agreements which contracting states must give effect 
to.
92
 These requirements are found in Article II, under which the arbitration agreement 
must, first and foremost, be in writing. The other requirements, as stated above, include the 
agreement dealing with existing or future disputes arising out of a defined legal 
relationship, the subject matter of which is capable of settlement by arbitration.
93
 
Furthermore, as imposed by Article V, the parties to the agreement must be capable of 
concluding such agreement and the agreement must be “valid under the law to which the 
parties have subjected it”.94 The UNCITRAL Model Law contains all of these 
requirements as well, adding a few clarifying provisions on what constitutes a written 
                                           
90 See Hemmo 2007a, pp. 180-181. 
91 See Chapter 2. 
92 For examples of requirements laid by other conventions, see Rubino-Sammartano 2001, pp. 202-203 
93 See Article II (1) of the New York Convention. 
94 See Article V (1) (a) of the New York Convention. 
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agreement.
95
 All of these requirements are naturally important, but in KKO 2013:84, all of 
these requirements except for one are undisputed and clear. Therefore, for the purposes of 
this thesis, this part of the chapter will be headlined by the requirement of written form. 
The Finnish Arbitration Act was revised in 1992. It was stated in its travaux préparatoires 
that the most important revision as to the arbitration agreement concerned the written form 
requirement.
96
 The provisions and requirements of the New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law were used and taken into account when revising the act in order 
to enable it to better answer the needs of “contract usage and technical means of the 
moment”.97 
Currently, the Finnish Arbitration Act defines the formal requirements of the arbitration 
agreement as follows: 
 “Section 3 
The arbitration agreement shall be in writing.  
An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in a document signed 
by the parties or in an exchange of letters between the parties. An arbitration 
agreement is also in writing when the parties, by exchanging telegrams or 
telexes or other such documents, have agreed that a dispute shall be decided 
by one or more arbitrators.  
An arbitration agreement is also in writing if an agreement which has been 
made in the manner mentioned in paragraph 2 refers to a document 
containing an arbitration clause. 
Section 4 
Arbitration clauses in wills, deeds of gift, bills of lading or similar 
documents, in the bylaws of an association, of a foundation, of a limited 
liability company or of another company or corporate entity and by which the 
                                           
95 See Article 7, Option 1, of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
96 See HE 202/1991. 
97 See ibid. 
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parties or the person against whom a claim is made are bound, shall have the 
same effect as arbitration agreements.”98 
The written form requirement is a so called absolute formal requirement
99
 without which 
the agreement is null and void.
100
 Interpretation of this formal requirement has typically 
been strict, necessitating e.g. in situations of exchange of letters that both parties exchange 
such letters in writing.
101
 Therefore, mere consent between the parties, however mutual and 
clear, is insufficient if not executed in the right form.
102
 This view adopted in Finland is 
rather typical, although many countries have given up the formal requirement.
103
 For 
example, in Sweden, practices between parties have been enough to establish an arbitration 
agreement.
104
 However, even though in the typical situation the parties mutually sign the 
agreement, no signature is required due to the provisions of section 3 subsection/paragraph 
2 of the Finnish Arbitration Act which clarifies the means available for the formation of a 
valid agreement. At the same time, the existence of a signature does not necessarily mean 
that there is consent to arbitration, e.g. in the case of fraud or duress. 
Rationales for the requirement of written form are easy to understand. Due to arbitration’s 
substitutive nature in relation to normal means of due process, i.e. litigation, anyone who 
attempts to prevent another’s access to court must be able to show that there is in fact an 
agreement to support it.
105
 The most effective and reliable way of doing this is evidence in 
writing – in other words, the agreement serves as proof.106 Moreover, in addition to the 
written form requirement’s significance as proof of the agreement, another justification 
arises from the need to ensure that the parties adequately understand the gravity of their 
waiver of due process.
107
 Another related reason might be ensuring that the parties take 
into account all relevant issues in their agreement, such as selection of arbitrators and the 
                                           
98 Translation of the Finnish Arbitration Act, see Paulsson 1984, Annex I of the Finland Chapter, p. 1. 
99 This is the author’s translation of the Finnish term ”varsinainen muotomääräys”, which is defined by 
being an absolute necessity for the contract to be valid. 
100 See Möller 1997, p. 18. 
101 See ibid. 
102 See Koulu 2008, p. 88. 
103 Scandinavian countries in particular have excelled in giving up the requirement of written form: see the 
Swedish Arbitration Act, the Norwegian Arbitration Act, the Danish Arbitration Act. See also the New 
Zealand Arbitration Act and the Belgian Arbitration Act. 
104 See Franke-Magnusson-Ragnwaldh-Wallin 2013, p. 11. 
105 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, pp. 89-90; Lew 2003, p. 131. 
106 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. 360. 
107 See Karrer – Kälin-Nauer 1996, p. 31; Born 2009, p. 584. 
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place of arbitral seat.
108
 Having these matters “recorded” in writing would allegedly help 
the parties in remembering to address them. However, as stated above, opinions on the 
necessity of written form of the agreement are not as adamant as they used to be and have 
started to change towards a more permissive stance.
109
  
In general, two differing opinions may be highlighted when it comes to the question of 
determining the validity of the arbitration agreement based on formal requirements. On the 
one hand there is formalism which supports the view that arbitration agreements must be 
concluded in writing.
110
 The traditional Finnish view on the matter is strongly formalist. 
However, on the other hand, there is consensualism which emphasizes the parties’ mutual 
intent of being bound by the agreement.
111
 According to this view, the form of the 
arbitration agreement is insignificant and the only thing required for the validity of the 
agreement is the actual intent. Therefore, oral agreements would be as valid as written 
ones. Naturally this view raises other problems, e.g. concerning proof of the agreement. 
The one carrying the burden of proof would probably be the party trying to pursue 
arbitration, but how high would the level of proof be set? However, even though 
consensualism definitely entails issues revolving around matters of proof, in addition to 
representing the actual intent of the parties to arbitrate (which is the essence of arbitration, 
in comparison to formal requirements which greatly promote matters of evidence) its 
flexibility would be well suited for the needs of the current international business 
environment. 
There are good grounds for not regarding the written form requirement as an absolute 
necessity. Firstly, the aforementioned waiver of one’s right of due process is not as 
relevant as it used to be because the arbitration regime internationally and nationally has 
developed to the point that it is nowadays the primary forum of commercial dispute 
resolution.
112
 Therefore, to subject the dispute to arbitration does no longer “endanger” 
one’s substantial right of having their case heard.113 Secondly, to demand the written form 
on the basis of providing sufficient proof is partially based around the notion mentioned 
above that arbitration may endanger one’s rights. However, since that idea no longer seems 
                                           
108 See Born 2009, p. 585. 
109 See ibid., p. 581, 585. 
110 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. 361. 
111 See ibid. 
112 See Born 2009, p. 585; see also Redfern-Hunter 2009, pp. 91-93. 
113 See Lew 2003, p. 132. 
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to be valid, and for the lack of better justifications, arbitration agreements may be 
considered as any other contracts.
114
 Since all judicial systems typically recognize oral 
agreements to be as valid as written ones, there is no clear reason why an oral arbitration 
agreement should be invalid.
115
 
One obvious foundation for accepting oral arbitration agreements may be construed using a 
theoretical situation. If a ship on international waters was in distress at sea, e.g. because of 
engine failure, it could contact another ship to get it back to port. In case the other ship 
used the radio to make an oral agreement concerning the towage with the ship in distress 
and mentioned that all disputes would be resolved in arbitration, and the ship in distress 
orally accepted this agreement, would it be justifiable that the agreement would 
automatically be invalid nonetheless? Would there be any other way of validly making a 
binding arbitration agreement in case no means other than radio were available, or would 
the towage ship be forced to accept the fact that this particular means of dispute resolution 
is not available to it? As the Supreme Court decision KKO 2013:84 does not concern oral 
agreements, this theoretical dilemma may be left unresolved. However, it does provide an 
interesting baseline for further assessment between different views of formal requirements. 
As the Supreme Court’s decision in KKO 2013:84 demonstrates, the aforementioned 
absolute formal requirement is apparently not considered absolute any longer.
116
 The 
Supreme Court expressly stated that, despite the obvious lack of written agreement in 
relation to the third party beneficiary, the beneficiary was still bound by the agreement. 
Question remains, however, whether the dismissal of the absolute formal requirement only 
applies to such third party situations. Would the Supreme Court have decided otherwise in 
case the dispute only concerned the existence of the arbitration agreement between A and 
B and the agreement was not in writing? This is another problem arising out of the almost 
complete lack of reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s recent decision which will be 
contemplated below when discussing alternative rationales for the decision. 
 
                                           
114 See Born 2009, p. 585. 
115 See ibid. 
116 See Chapter 3.4. 
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4.4 Parties to arbitration 
One fundamental cornerstone of arbitration is surely the notion that arbitration is only 
binding on the parties of the arbitration agreement. This view is provided in section 2 of 
the Finnish Arbitration Act, stating that “any dispute […] which can be settled by 
agreement between the parties may be referred for final decision by one or more 
arbitrators” (emphasis added). This universally accepted position is also backed up by the 
New York Convention
117
 and the UNCITRAL Model Law
118
, both of which provide for 
the recognition of arbitration agreements “by the parties”. Also the leading international 
arbitration institutions provide in their rules for arbitration between the parties.
119
 
The Finnish Arbitration Act does not address the capacity of parties to enter into an 
arbitration agreement. However, the general rule is that all natural and legal persons and 
entities that are able to enter into a valid agreement can also enter into an arbitration 
agreement.
120
 
The question “who are the parties of the arbitration agreement?” refers to the scope ratione 
personae of arbitration, the subjective scope.
121
 The question is easy to answer in the 
typical arbitration process which involves two adversary parties. As presented by an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal,  
“in arbitration only those who are parties to the arbitration agreement 
expressed in writing could appear in the arbitral proceedings either as 
claimants or as defendants. This basic rule, inherent to the essentially 
voluntary nature of arbitration, is recognised internationally by virtue of 
Article II of the New York Convention”.122 (emphasis added) 
Despite this presumption, there are many situations in which the usual premise does not 
work. Such situation might arise when a signatory company’s parent company has been 
actively involved in setting up the business deal which includes an arbitration agreement. 
                                           
117 Article II (1) of the New York Convention. 
118 Article 7 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
119 See Article 6 (1) of the ICC Rules; Article 1 (1) of the UNCITRAL Rules; preamble of the LCIA Rules. 
120 See Lew 2003, p. 140. Because in KKO 2013:84, capacity of the parties is not disputed, further 
discussion on the subject will be limited outside the scope of the thesis. 
121 See Born 2009, pp. 1133-1134. 
122 See Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement v. Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp., award 
of 17 November 1994. 
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In the event that a dispute arises, the opposing signatory company may want to include the 
rich parent company in the arbitration proceedings as well, e.g. to increase the likelihood 
of receiving damages. For this purpose, there are sometimes circumstances which enable 
the opposing party to invoke the group of companies doctrine against the non-signatory 
parent company, making it bound to the arbitration as well. 
Especially in international commercial arbitration, it has become a generally recognized 
rule that there are multiple ways in which third parties may be bound to arbitration, even if 
not as signatories of the arbitration agreement.
123
Moreover, such involvement of outside 
parties occurs more and more frequently.
124
 For this purpose, there are several doctrines 
deriving from different legal systems, such as agency, veil-piercing, group of companies, 
alter ego, implied consent, succession, estoppel and third party beneficiary, apparent 
mandate and ostensible authority.
125
 However, calling them “special mechanisms of law” 
above is a fairly superficial concept as several of them are merely constructs used in other 
areas of law, e.g. general private law (agency) and company law (veil piercing). Moreover, 
the use of any such doctrines has been criticized as superfluous and unnecessary surrogates 
of private law: “irrelevant […] is the need for any doctrinal apparatus whatever other than 
the law of private agreement”.126 Nevertheless, whatever the instrument, limiting 
arbitration to the signatory parties only is not altogether so clear after all. 
As Hanotiau mentions, it may be contemplated whether equity and justice have in some 
decisions and awards been the ultimate reason for the conclusions and these 
aforementioned doctrines only used as ex post facto tools.
127
 However, the whole subject 
of binding non-signatories to arbitration in general revolves around the notion of finding 
the “right” decision in a situation where the non-signatory would be able to avert the effect 
of an otherwise valid arbitration clause. Moreover, the issue of binding non-signatories is 
in general considered to be governed by ordinary principles of contract (and agency) 
law.
128
 In other words, the doctrines merely provide useful tools for contract interpretation. 
                                           
123 See Hanotiau 2006, p. 8; Born 2009, p. 1137; Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 99. For case law, see also e.g. 
Thomson-CSF, SA v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d (2d Cir. 1995); Alamria v. Telcor Int'l, Inc., 920 
F.Supp. (D. Md. 1996). 
124 See Van den Berg 2003, pp. 633-634. 
125 See supra note 123. 
126 See Rau 2008, p. 238. 
127 See Hanotiau 2006, pp. 8-9. In this context, ex post facto tool indicates to the doctrines being used as 
legal justification for an already decided conclusion. However, this conception easily regresses to a 
“which came first, the chicken or the egg” discussion and will not be argued here. 
128 See Born 2009, p. 1138. 
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They are applied in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case and contract 
to analyze the parties’ intentions and consequences thereof.129 
These doctrines have been readily used in foreign case law
130
. However, in the few cases 
concerning the subject in Finland, none of these doctrines have been used as such. Even 
though the Supreme Court decisions KKO 2007:18 and the recent KKO 2013:84 do 
address the same question, the reasoning of the court relies on general contract 
interpretation instead. However, due to the lack of legal sources in Finland or the lack of 
reasoning in the previous Supreme Court precedents, there is no reason not to seek 
guidance from foreign case law and legal literature as tools of interpretation. Furthermore, 
due to the transnational nature of arbitration, international practices are relevant. Therefore, 
the thesis will introduce the essential doctrines of the ones mentioned above. Special 
attention will naturally be paid to the third party beneficiary doctrine which may be applied 
in the case at hand. 
Before delving into the doctrines themselves, it is useful to first acknowledge the 
difference between the constructs thereof. Some of the doctrines apply relevant facts to 
determine whether party consent exists regardless of the missing signature or written 
agreement, therefore binding the non-signatory, whereas others need not invoke party 
consent whatsoever. Instead, the latter ones use the concept of equity and employ the force 
of law in interpreting actual factual circumstances to support binding the non-signatory.
131
 
These equity based doctrines can be regarded as non-consensual and the former ones as 
consensual theories of subjecting third parties.
132
 In essence, the consensual doctrines may 
be regarded to be of more legal value due to the fact that their function is identifying the 
underlying party consent which automatically results in the non-signatory being bound. As 
for the non-consensual theories, the conception is to “force” the non-signatory to 
arbitration despite the (possibly) obvious lack of intent and/or consent. 
This division between the consensual and non-consensual means also carries significance 
in the considerations as to whether the non-signatory becomes an actual party of the 
arbitration agreement or if it is “only” bound by it. This subject will be discussed further in 
                                           
129 See ibid., p. 1139. 
130 See e.g. Thomson-CSF, SA v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d (2d Cir. 1995); Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers 
v. Optibase, Ltd, 337 F.3d (2d Cir. 2003); Dow Chemical France, The Dow Chemical Company and 
others v ISOVER Saint Gobain, Interim Award, ICC Case No. 4131, 23 September 1982. 
131 See Born 2009, p. 1140 
132 See ibid., p. 1142 
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Chapter 6.1.1. However, for the sake of clarity, the thesis will next introduce the 
consensual doctrines first and the non-consensual ones after. 
 
4.4.1 Agency 
Agency is the easiest and most simple form of the situations in which a non-signatory is 
subjected to arbitration.
133
 It is a universally accepted principle, also established in the 
Finnish Contracts Act, that whoever has authorized another person to act on his or her 
behalf (the principle) shall be bound by the judicial acts conducted by said person (the 
agent) in the principle’s name in relation to a third party.134 One of the most common 
forms of such principle-agent relationship is seen in the actions of company 
representatives, typically the executive officers. If a company’s representative (agent) 
commits to an arbitration agreement on behalf of the company (principle), it is the 
company that shall be bound instead of the representative.
135
 
Although rare, it is still possible, however, that the agent will be bound by or may invoke 
the arbitration agreement in addition to the principle.
136
 Such situation may arise (and has 
arisen) e.g. when a company has sued its representative in the course of his or her 
employment. In some cases such employee has been able to invoke the arbitration 
agreement engaged by the employee on behalf of the company in relation to a third 
party.
137
 
It is noteworthy that the agent’s mandate to act on behalf of the principle may be express 
or implied.
138
 Whether it is the former or the latter will affect the circumstances under 
which the third party and/or the principle are bound by the agreement. However, this 
subject will not be discussed further in this context. 
 
                                           
133 See ibid., pp. 1142-1143 
134 See Section 10 of the Finnish Contracts Act; see also Article 2.2.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts 2010; Hanotiau 2006, p. 11; Born 2009, pp. 1142-1143. 
135 See e.g. Article 2.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010. 
136 See Hanotiau 2006, p.10. 
137 See e.g. Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d (6th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. A.R. Baron & Co., 967 F.Supp. 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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33 
 
4.4.2 Transfer of contract 
Another very typical situation where a non-signatory becomes bound by the arbitration 
agreement is when a transfer of contractual rights occurs. This may happen e.g. by 
assignment, assumption, merger or subrogation.
139
 When a contract is transferred, both the 
rights and duties are transferred along with it. It has been the subject of many disputes, 
however, whether the assignee is bound by the potential arbitration clause.
140
 The 
predominant opinion used to support not binding the assignee due to the personal nature of 
the obligation to arbitrate (once again, the reference to the notion of arbitration being a 
waiver of the right of due process may be seen here).
141
 However, this view has universally 
changed to allowing the parties to decide on the transfer of the arbitration clause as well.
142
 
As a consequence, the parties may also expressly assume or renounce the arbitration 
agreement.
143
 The emphasis in the interpretation of whether a transfer has been valid is on 
the parties’ intent. 
As a result of the separability presumption
144
, there have been arguments concerning the 
possibility of a valid assignment of the arbitration agreement regardless of the invalidity of 
the assignment of the underlying contract.
145
 Such situation might occur for instance when 
there is a contractual restriction of assignment in the underlying contract. However, this 
discussion will be limited outside the scope of this work. 
 
4.4.3 Implied consent 
Implied consent as a theory of binding non-signatories to arbitration is deduced from the 
basic principle of contract law which allows the formation of contracts in ways other than 
by express stipulation or formal execution.
146
 Such implicit agreement may be reached e.g. 
                                           
139 See ibid., p. 18; see also Born 2009, p. 1187. 
140 See Born 2009, p. 1187. 
141 See ibid., p. 1188. As for the “obligation” to arbitrate, in GMAC Comm. Credit LLC v. Springs Indus., 
Inc., F.Supp.2d 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the court regarded arbitration as a remedy instead of an 
obligation. 
142 See Born 2009, p. 1188; see also Trippe Mfg Co. v. Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d (3d Cir. 2005); Cone 
Constr., Inc. v. Drummond Cmty. Bank, So.2d (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). For further discussion on the 
requirements and details of assignment and automatic transfer, see Vincze 2003. 
143 See e.g. Gruntal & Co., Inc. v. Steinberg, F.Supp. 324, 335-36 (D.N.J. 1994). 
144 See supra Chapter 4.1. 
145 See Born 2009, p. 1191. 
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on the basis of a party’s conduct. In a traditional example of such agreement, when 
stepping into a bus, the passenger does not sign a contract which provides for a transport 
for him or her in return of a certain amount of money. Neither does the passenger sign a 
contract approving the general terms or conditions of the transport. These matters are 
regarded as given, and with his or her conduct (stepping into the bus) the passenger 
impliedly consents. 
Another means of reaching an implied agreement is by interpreting party intent in 
retrospect. Such interpretation is typically conducted by courts or arbitral tribunals. In case 
the text of the contract is ambiguous, but from the contract and the factual circumstances it 
may be discerned that the parties in fact intended for a certain consequence, the parties 
may be regarded to have agreed on the said consequence in a legally binding manner. In 
other words, through implied agreement. 
Crucial in determining the existence of implied consent is party intent.
147
 It is necessary 
that both sides, the signatories and the non-signatory, have intended to be bound by the 
arbitration clause. This consideration is derived from the requirements of the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law (and the requirements of national laws) 
which only provide for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and agreements 
“between parties”.148 As the purpose of the doctrine of implied consent is to identify the 
actual consent of parties, it is necessary that the consent is mutual as required from any 
arbitration agreement (as explained above). 
 
Similarly with the examples above, a non-signatory third party may impliedly consent to 
be bound by the arbitration clause of another parties’ agreement.149 Naturally, these 
signatory parties must have had this purpose as well. This type of consent may occur by 
the non-signatory’s subsequent conduct by which it “regards itself bound by the arbitration 
clause”150 For example, the non-signatory may show its acceptance of the arbitration 
clause by invoking it in the event of a dispute. However, it is important to keep in mind the 
separability doctrine of arbitration agreements in this instance as well. When defining the 
                                           
147 See Born 2009, pp. 1150-1151. 
148 See supra notes 91-93. 
149 See Lamm-Aqua 2003, pp. 725-726; see also ICC case no. 9771 of 2001, cited in Hanotiau 2006, pp. 
33-34. 
150 See ibid., quoting Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. v. Drago Daic Interests, Inc., 138 F.3d (5th Cir. 
1998); see also Hanotiau 2006, p. 36. 
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existence of implied consent, the non-signatory must be regarded to have consented to the 
arbitration clause in particular instead of the underlying agreement and its obligations.
151
 
On the other hand, the typical conclusion is that by consenting to the underlying 
agreement, the non-signatory also agrees to be bound by the arbitration clause therein.
152
 
 
4.4.4 Third party beneficiary 
As expressly stated e.g. in UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,  
“the parties (the ‘promisor’ and the ‘promisee’) may confer by express or 
implied agreement a right on a third party (the ‘beneficiary’).”153 
This possibility to grant rights is universally regarded as given in general contract law. As 
a result, non-signatory third parties may claim such rights in a legally binding way. As for 
this concept in the context of arbitration, third party beneficiaries may invoke or become 
bound by arbitration agreements they have no part in except for a right granted to them 
therein.
154
 
The general premise in a number of court cases has been that a non-signatory party who 
invokes a contract provision in order to claim rights is also bound by the arbitration clause 
of such contract.
155
 However, the signatory parties may have just as well intended not to 
extend the arbitration clause to any outside party. Critical, once again, is the underlying 
intent which is defined by usual contract interpretation. As a court has stated, “under third 
party beneficiary theory, a court must look to the intentions of the parties at the time the 
contract was executed.”156 Therefore, in comparison to other doctrines which assess the 
question of binding non-signatories based on the conduct after the execution of the 
contract, the third party beneficiary doctrine solely relies on the original intent of the 
parties in making the contract.
 157
 It is noteworthy that for this exact reason the decisive 
                                           
151 See Born 2009, p. 1152. 
152 See ibid. 
153 See Article 5.2.1 (1) of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010). 
154 See Hanotiau 2006, p. 14; Born 2009, p. 1178; see also Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life Assur. 
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155 See Born 2009, p. 1179; Hobér 2011, pp. 135-136. 
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factor is the intent of the signatory parties. This conclusion may be drawn from the 
sentiment that the intent of the parties is inferred on the basis of the contract and its 
language, the drafting of which is conducted solely by the signatories.
158
  
Third party beneficiary issues and their resolution may sometimes be very close to and/or 
decided on similar grounds with the equitable estoppel doctrine.
159
 Despite these two 
theories being distinguishable in the sense that one is a consensual doctrine and the other 
non-consensual, both may justifiably be used for resolving parallel or the same non-
signatory beneficiary issues, as discussed below.
160
 
 
4.4.5 Equitable estoppel 
Equitable estoppel is a theory which relies on the notion of equity and good faith.
161
 It is 
used to bar the resisting signatory or non-signatory from denying the applicability of the 
arbitration clause.
162
 Equitable estoppel is a theory most commonly used in common law 
jurisdictions. It is not unheard of in civil law countries either, although a different concept 
may be used instead, such as good faith or abuse of right.
163
 
As stated above, equitable estoppel may sometimes be used as a parallel reasoning with the 
third party beneficiary doctrine. However, equitable estoppel is based on equity (as may be 
inferred from its name), and instead of finding consent it may “force” the non-signatory to 
arbitration or let the non-signatory invoke the arbitration clause regardless of the 
signatory’s objection. 
Equitable estoppel rests upon the concept that a party should not be able to act 
inconsistently with its previous actions or statements and this way avoid liability. 
Therefore, under the “direct benefits” estoppel theory, a party claiming or exercising rights 
directly derived from the provisions of a contract is also bound by the arbitration clause 
                                           
158 See Hanotiau 2006, p. 15. 
159 See ibid. p. 1180. 
160 In addition to these two doctrines, it is advisable to bear in mind that several of these doctrines, 
especially ones that employ consent as their foundation, may be invoked or taken into account in 
assessing individual cases. For example, constructions based on implied consent and third party 
beneficiary doctrines may sometimes overlap. 
161 See Lew 2003, p. 139. 
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therein.
164
 Simply put, a person should not be able to pick the cherry (the benefit granted in 
the underlying agreement) from the top of the cake and leave the rest (the arbitration 
clause) untouched. As stated in Int'l Paper Co., 
“a party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a 
written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause 
when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same 
contract should be enforced to benefit him”.165 
There has been discussion on the use of equitable estoppel as a “sword” or “shield”.166 This 
discussion relates to whether the doctrine should only be available for use as a defense 
(shield) for non-signatories who want to invoke an arbitration clause. The opposite use as a 
sword would let signatory parties to invoke equitable estoppel to compel non-signatories to 
arbitration. The discussion has arisen from the idea that such tool is “appropriate” only to 
be used against signatories because they have in fact agreed to arbitration, in comparison to 
the opposite situation where no such consent exists.
167
 However, the author, as well as 
Born
168
, considers such approach erroneous. The essence of equity and good faith should 
work both ways as established in the direct benefit theory. As opposed to decisions which 
rely on the notion that arbitration is “strictly a matter of contract”169 and therefore deny 
binding non-signatories, arbitration is in fact no longer as strictly tied to such formalities as 
it used to be. Accordingly, allowing non-signatories to use such defense based on an 
outdated concept to avoid the “equitable” responsibility would seem to work against the 
very purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel and fairness. 
Despite the doctrine of equitable estoppel being most commonly used in common law 
jurisdictions, especially in the United States, it may be deemed relevant in civil law 
countries as well. As elaborated above, the topic of arbitration is international if anything, 
which is why international and transnational norms may be taken into account even when 
contemplating on national cases, such as KKO 2013:84. The notion of good faith and 
equity in law still stands in Finland, even if in a different form than a specific doctrine. For 
                                           
164 See Hanotiau 2006, p. 24; see also Born 2009, p. 1195. 
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instance, the essence of equitable estoppel may be found in the offer-reply mechanism, 
according to which the reply will have to accept the offer as such or else it will constitute a 
new counter-offer.
170
 Accordingly, equitable estoppel prevents the party receiving the 
benefit from only accepting the benefit and “discarding” the possible obligations subsumed 
into it. Moreover, the principle of good faith and prohibition of contradictory behavior is 
deemed to be “enshrined” in the New York Convention; not as equitable estoppel but as a 
duty to act consistently and in good faith towards the other party.
171
 Therefore, 
considerations based on equitable estoppel may and should be acknowledged as well as 
used in the case at hand. The application of the doctrine in KKO 2013:84 will be discussed 
more thoroughly in Chapter 6.4. 
 
4.4.6 Piercing the corporate veil 
Piercing (or lifting) the corporate veil, also called “alter ego”, is a doctrine based on equity 
which aims to identify corporate entities that are not officially parties of the agreement but 
whose actions or position may still subject them to the provisions of the agreement, such as 
the arbitration clause.
172
 These actions are typically connected to misuse or abuse of rights 
or fraud in the sense that the company whose “veil is pierced” is deemed to have used such 
dominating authority on the signatory company that it is “appropriate to disregard the two 
companies’ separate legal forms, and to treat them as a single entity”.173 Such abuse of the 
separation of legal entities is in these circumstances used inappropriately as a shield 
against legal liability.
174
 
Determinations concerning the existence of such factual alter ego situation pay no attention 
to the intentions of the parties.
175
 Instead, factual circumstances are assessed in order to 
find the aforementioned inappropriate behavior, upon finding of which the use of the 
doctrine to pierce the corporate veil is based on fairness. However, the thesis will not delve 
                                           
170 See infra note 325. 
171 See Article II of the New York Convention. See also Van den Berg 1981, p. 185; Born 2009, pp. 1196-
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172 See Born 2009, pp. 1153-1154. The term “alter ego” is also used, which describes the essence of the 
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deeper into the subject of alter ego due to the fact that no such inappropriate actions 
occurred in KKO 2013:84. 
 
4.5 Party consent 
“Consent to an arbitration agreement lies in the parties' common intention to 
submit disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them to one 
or more private adjudicators.”176 
Arbitration is a process based on consent: without an agreement of the parties to arbitrate 
there can be no arbitration.
 177
 Arbitration is a deviation from litigation, the typical forum 
of dispute resolution organized by the state which every person (and company) is naturally 
entitled to. This fundamental right is directly provided in the constitution.
178
 When an 
arbitration agreement is made, the dispute within the scope of such agreement can no 
longer be brought to court. Therefore, subjecting oneself to arbitration constitutes a waiver 
of this right of due process, which is why an agreement is necessitated. 
Even though the idea of party consent as the backbone of arbitration agreements is 
relatively self-evident, the means of establishing party consent are not necessarily so. In 
case there is a signed, written agreement, there will be no problem. However, if the 
agreement is incoherent and ambiguous and a party repudiates its purpose of subjecting the 
dispute to arbitration, the situation is different. These matters are resolved by means of 
contract interpretation, which will be discussed further alongside the concept of consent in 
general in Chapter 6. 
  
                                           
176 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. 253. 
177 An exception to this rule comes in the form of compulsory arbitration. However, due to the limitations of 
the thesis, it will be left outside the scope of this work. 
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5 REVISITING THE CASE 
5.1 Introduction 
Now that the essential elements of arbitration agreements have been introduced, the thesis 
will next begin to look into the Supreme Court case KKO 2013:84 more thoroughly.  As 
stated above, the decision of the Supreme Court seemed hasty; the rationale behind it was 
certainly not lucid nor did it seem like the Supreme Court had given much time to assess 
the grounds on which it based the decision. Or in case it had, it did not transpire from the 
decision. Therefore, the thesis will move to reassess the case and the merits thereof, 
discussing the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeal in juxtaposition and 
using them as tools of comparison. The reason for using the decisions of the courts of 
lower instance is that both of them took into account two significant factors underlining the 
circumstances of the case and based their conclusions around them. These factors are the 
requirement of written arbitration agreement in the Finnish Arbitration Act and granting of 
a benefit to a third party conditionally. 
The case study will continue in Chapter 6, in which the thesis will move on to consider 
alternative deliberations on how the case should be interpreted. This part will heavily rely 
on the concept of consent and whether there are indications as to the intent of the parties. 
These theories do not exclude the rationale of the Court of Appeal, but may instead be 
regarded to provide support for its view. 
 
5.2 Requirement of written agreement 
As presented above in the form of the first research question
179
, the thesis will begin its 
analysis of the case with the assessment of whether section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act 
creates an absolute obstacle to binding non-signatory beneficiaries to arbitration. As will 
transpire (see below), the requirement of written form, interpreted purely according to the 
wording and the consensual nature of arbitration, would seem to prevent binding outside 
parties. Therefore, the subject will be discussed more thoroughly even though the Supreme 
Court bypasses it as little more than a detail. 
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Although the decision of the District Court of Satakunta carries no significant legal value 
in itself, it is useful to keep in mind the rationale of the decision because it indeed 
considered the Finnish Arbitration Act as an obstacle in the matter. The District Court in its 
formalistic approach took the standpoint that the provision of law necessitating an 
“agreement in writing” does prevent binding third party beneficiaries who have not 
formally expressed their consent to be bound. More precisely, the District Court stated that 
even though there are ways in which outside parties may be subjected to arbitration, such 
as succession or transfer of contract, this did not apply in the case at hand where the non-
signatory was a third party beneficiary. 
In other words, this type of reasoning seems to implicate that in the case of a third party 
beneficiary, the scope ratione personae of the arbitration agreement is to be interpreted 
narrowly. This means that because it is not a question of a clearly defined situation, such as 
succession, a third party beneficiary could not be bound without an express written 
consent. According to the court, this view was supported by the fact the signatory parties 
had the option of binding the non-signatory with an express stipulation indicating such 
intent. Therefore, in the absence of such clear proof of intent, the letter of the law was the 
determining factor. 
This view, as may have become apparent, is in the light of foreign case law and legal 
literature rather old fashioned as becoming bound to arbitration as a third party beneficiary 
is a well-recognized doctrine.
180
 As explained above, it has been widely accepted that there 
are multiple ways in which such third parties may be subjected to arbitration. Even though 
in Finland it is also considered possible that the arbitration agreement may extend its effect 
outside the usual scope of signatory parties, the specific question of third party beneficiary 
is not among these familiar concepts. 
Although the decision of the Supreme Court in KKO 2013:84 gave away the ultimate 
conclusion (the conclusion being that third party beneficiaries may be bound without a 
written agreement), it is important to determine on what basis such conclusion may be 
drawn. Since the Supreme Court did not deem important the rationale on the basis of which 
the letter of the law was bypassed, the thesis will address the question. 
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5.2.1 Assessment of the requirement in form 
As stated above, e.g. by Möller, the prerequisite for the formal validity of an arbitration 
agreement is that it shall be made in writing.
181
 This requirement is expressly stated in 
section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act.
182
 Moreover section 2 of the same act
183
 specifies 
the well acknowledged fact that the arbitration agreement is initially only binding on the 
parties.
184
 If these provisions of the act are to be interpreted accurately and faithfully to the 
wording, it means that in order to legally bind any parties who are being subjected to 
arbitration, there must be an agreement between these exact parties. Furthermore, this 
agreement must be made in writing. Therefore, the conclusion of this strict interpretation 
of the absolute formal requirement in KKO 2013:84 would be that because there is no 
agreement between the signatory party and the non-signatory beneficiary, let alone an 
agreement in writing, the non-signatory beneficiary cannot be bound by the arbitration 
clause. This theory is endorsed by the principle of voluntariness arbitration is based on. 
Furthermore, as plainly stated by Born, 
“Although form requirements are archaic, […]  where they exist these 
requirements logically must apply for the benefit of each party: a party as to 
whom the “signature” or “exchange” requirements under the Convention or 
national law were not satisfied would, in principle, not be bound by the 
agreement.”185 (emphasis added) 
This notion may be supported with the underlying purpose of the absolute formal 
requirement that no person can be allowed to give up their constitutional right of due 
process without a conscious intent.
186
 Such position towards arbitration typically highlights 
arbitration’s role as a renunciation of the guarantee of judicial relief.187 Moreover, in case a 
waiver of such substantial right is made, there must be a recording of such event due to its 
gravity. This type of strict position to the formal requirements has earlier been common: 
                                           
181 See Möller 1997, p. 18; see also Ovaska 2007, p. 49. 
182 See supra note 98. 
183 Section 2 of the Finnish Arbitration Act, see supra note 58. 
184 See Möller 1997, pp. 19-21. 
185 See Born 2009, p. 1210. 
186 See Ovaska 2007, p. 64. 
187 See ibid., p. 49. This view may be and has been challenged. See infra note 190. 
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“It is not necessary that the arbitration agreement is made separately; […] It 
is clear, however, that the document which is being drafted or which contains 
the arbitration agreement will have to be signed by the parties.”188 (emphasis 
added) 
The context of strict interpretation is connected to earlier attitudes towards arbitration in 
general during the last century.
189
 Suspicion towards arbitration as the process dislodging 
normal court litigation arose from the potential downsides of arbitration among other 
things. Arbitration was considered not to offer similar certainty of legal protection as 
litigation and arbitrators were regarded easily biased as well as lacking expertise.
190
 
Moreover, arbitration agreements were viewed as vague and ambiguous
191
, which was 
regarded to result in parties to arbitration agreements accidentally subjecting to arbitration 
matters which they in fact did not intend to arbitrate.
192
 The formal requirement was 
considered to reduce the risk of such uninformed decision-making. As a “natural result” of 
the requirement in form, formation of arbitration agreement through the concept of implied 
agreement was not possible either.
193
 
However, despite formal requirements typically being used for separating the preparation 
and the actual execution of the agreement as well as promoting diligent deliberation and 
evidential matters, the paucity of such requirements derives from the legislator’s attitude 
towards them as a sort of necessary evil.
194
 In short, their use should be supported by 
cogent interests. Moreover, to interpret the form requirement of section 3 of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act so strictly would factually impede the use of arbitration agreements in 
modern business. It would prevent or at least significantly complicate its use outside the 
typical bi-party arbitration. Therefore, despite the premise that the arbitration agreement 
only binds the parties thereof, it has been established in Finnish case law and legal 
                                           
188 See Granfelt 1941, p. 25. See also KKO:1932-II-175. It is noteworthy that before the reform of the 
Finnish Arbitration Act in 1992, a formally valid arbitration agreement could also be made in front of a 
court of justice, see Granfelt 1941, pp. 18-19, 24-25. 
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literature (as well as in section 4 of the Finnish Arbitration Act concerning certain specific 
circumstances)
195
 that it is possible to become bound to arbitration even without entering 
into an arbitration agreement through formal execution.
196
Universal succession, such as 
inheritance, and succession to specific rights and obligations, such as transfer of contract, 
are typically mentioned. In addition, an arbitration agreement made in the name of a 
general partnership is considered to bind the partners of said company (as well as provide 
the partners with access to arbitration).
197
 
It may therefore be deemed well established that despite the seemingly strict requirement 
in form of section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act, it is by no means an absolute 
requirement anymore. Jurisprudential discussion in general has emphasized the perception 
that formal requirements (not only in arbitration) should not be given an absolute value 
even when such requirements exist.
198
 On the contrary, the “implicit understanding” of the 
signatory parties may be considered cogent enough to be given more significance than 
formal or substantial requirements in some cases.
199
 Naturally, this aspect hardly applies to 
situations where the existence of the arbitration agreement between the signatory parties is 
being judged. Nonetheless, this rather self-evident view taking emphasis away from the 
formal requirement is confirmed in the Supreme Court decision KKO 2013:84, which at 
the latest (in Finland) validates the non-absolute nature of the formal requirement of law 
and the extent of the arbitration agreement to reach third party beneficiaries. 
It may also be noted that the grounds for supporting the strict interpretation of the form 
requirement (mentioned above) can no longer be regarded valid in the current business or 
legal environment. As opposed to the ideas that arbitration offers no certain legal 
protection, arbitration agreements are somehow vague or that the process is too unreliable 
or unprofessional, the modern trend seems to favor the notion that arbitration is starting to 
resemble traditional litigation in too many ways. 
In the light of the reasoning above, another question concerning section 3 of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act may be posed. Does the provision actually apply to the situation of binding 
third parties or is it in fact solely directed at the actual agreement between the signatory 
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parties? The construction of this rule of interpretation is in line with the theories used to 
extend the effects of the arbitration agreement to others than the signatory parties. In case 
two parties intend to enter into an arbitration agreement, the requirements of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act apply. However, after the agreement has been validly and definitely 
concluded, it exists as a legal concept, which may be regarded as the purpose of the formal 
requirements of the law. As for the scope and extent of the agreement, e.g. the scope 
ratione personae, these considerations are no longer defined by the formal requirements of 
the law due to the fact that the valid agreement already exists, but according to different 
factors, such as the intent of the signatory parties or other factual circumstances, which 
may be deemed not to be subject to the formal requirements. 
According to this model of construction of section 3 of the Finnish arbitration Act, the lack 
of the third party’s signature in KKO 2013:84 carries no legal significance. Since the 
validity of the arbitration agreement itself has been established under the requirements of 
the act, the parties to the agreement may be determined without reference to the formal 
requirements therein.
200
 Rather, “the agreement takes its binding force through some 
circumstance other than the formality of signature.”201 Such construct on the application of 
the law was adopted in a landmark case of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in 2003 as 
well as several U.S. courts
202
 and would serve both the needs and the current alignment of 
interpretation of the scope of arbitration agreements. 
 
5.3 Granting rights to third parties conditionally 
5.3.1 Legal basis 
Now that a justifiable legal basis for dismissing (or rather, the non-application of) the 
formal requirement of section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act has been established, the 
thesis will move on to consider the essentials of party autonomy in the case at hand. The 
second research question
203
 inquires whether the arbitration agreement (in the form of a 
clause) can be regarded to constitute an accessory to the right granted to the third party 
beneficiary. In other words, in KKO 2013:84, can the signatory parties impose on the non-
                                           
200 Similar approach to the issue has been adopted in Brinsmead 2007, p. 2. 
201 See Park 2009, p. 7. 
202 See Hanotiau 2006, pp. 52-53. 
203 See supra Chapter 1.3. 
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signatory beneficiary the obligation to arbitrate any related disputes as a condition to the 
right of redemption? The question leads to another: how far does the autonomy and 
discretion of the signatory parties go, and does the consensual nature of arbitration 
agreement impose any restrictions on it? 
In its decision
204
, the Court of Appeal of Vaasa took the position that even though the 
underlying shareholders’ agreement itself did not bind the non-signatory party, the 
signatory parties nevertheless had the right to stipulate the conditions under which they 
undertake to be bound in relation to the non-signatory. Therefore, the signatory parties 
were able to grant the right of redemption to the third party with the condition that the right 
was subject to the arbitration clause. 
In order to assess whether the view of the Court of Appeal is justifiable, it is necessary to 
first determine the legal basis with which the question is analyzed. In this assessment, for 
the sake of clarity, the starting point may be the sources of law under which the decision is 
made. 
Aarnio divides legal sources into strongly binding, such as law and established custom, 
weakly binding, such as ratio legis and case law, and lastly permissible sources, such as 
arguments based on comparative law, jurisprudence and real or value based arguments.
205
 
Accordingly, under the established theory on sources of law concerning contract 
interpretation in Finland, the first and most important source is mandatory law and its 
travaux préparatoires, followed by the terms of contract of the parties.
206
 In case the 
conclusion cannot be found based on these sources, the decision may be based on case law, 
applicable trade practices and general principles of law.
207
 This train of thought leads to the 
rather self-evident conclusion that since there are no provisions of law to assess the 
signatory parties’ right to grant rights to third parties, the question shall be examined in the 
light of possible case law and the established rules and principles of general contract law. 
It is generally acknowledged in legal literature that, even though there are certain specific 
features and  requirements to arbitration agreements as a special form of agreement
208
, the 
                                           
204 See supra Chapter 3.3. 
205 See Aarnio 1989, pp. 220-221. 
206 See Hemmo 2007a, pp. 563-565, 577. 
207 See ibid. 
208 See Möller 1997, pp. 14-18. These specific requirements include e.g. issues of arbitrability. 
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interpretation of arbitration agreements, as briefly mentioned above
209
, is similar to any 
other types of agreements – the rules and principles of general (national) contract law 
apply.
210
 This subject is related to the traditional discussion on whether the character of 
arbitration agreements is that of procedural or civil law.
211
 The former is closely connected 
to the legal process and is typically concluded or realized in court proceedings, whereas the 
latter refers to typical everyday agreements.
212
 Out of this discussion, the conclusion has 
been drawn in Scandinavia that arbitration agreements are to be considered private civil 
law agreements (with special characteristics indicating to procedural law). As a natural 
corollary, 
“general private law principles […]apply to arbitration agreements as well. 
Therefore, common contract law is a self-evident premise.”213 
In short, evaluation of the extent of the signatory parties’ right to grant benefits to third 
parties is done using principles of general contract law. The same goes for the 
interpretation of arbitration agreements as to the scope, extent and purpose, which are 
conducted using the usual means of contract interpretation.
214
 This conception is congruent 
with the requirement that “the parties must have the right to settle the dispute which they 
wish to submit to arbitration”.215 Since subjecting oneself to arbitration is a matter of 
agreement, the evaluation of the existence of such agreement should be conducted using 
ordinary means of contract interpretation.  
Next, the thesis will discuss the position of Finnish contract law in relation to rights 
granted to third parties. Afterwards, it will move on to discuss the most essential principles 
of contract interpretation applicable to the case. 
 
                                           
209 See supra notes 2, 73. 
210 See e.g. Tirkkonen 1943, p. 102; Möller 1997, p. 19; Born 2009, pp. 1063-1065; Lew 2003, p. 150. 
211 See Tirkkonen 1943, p. 37; see also Koulu 2008, p. 31. 
212 See Koulu 2008, pp. 31-32. The distinction between these two species of agreements is a relatively 
unrelated subject to the issue at hand and will therefore not be discussed further. 
213 See ibid., p. 32. 
214 Considerations relating to the existence of the arbitration agreement may be inseparably connected to 
these means as well; see infra Chapter 6.2. 
215 See Section 2 of the Finnish Arbitration Act; see also Kurkela – Uoti 1994, p. 5. 
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5.3.2 Third party rights and obligations 
Privity of contract is a universally accepted doctrine under which contracts do not affect 
outside parties (alteri stipulari nemo potest).
216
 The doctrine may be divided into two 
major principles of contract law: first, a contract may not create obligations to third parties, 
and second, third parties do not get rights from contracts made by other people. Naturally 
there are exceptions to these rules, the essential one in this case being an agreement to 
grant rights to a third party beneficiary (negotium in favorem tertii).
217
 As discussed above, 
it is a generally acknowledged fact that parties to a contract may grant rights to third 
parties.
218
 In these situations, it is up to the third party to decide whether it will capitalize 
on the right or not. 
Such a right granted to a third party manifests itself in the third party’s protected legal 
status, i.e. the possibility of the party to bring an action to promote its right.
219
 In the 
absence of such protected independent status, it is merely a situation where the signatory 
parties of the contract have agreed among themselves on a performance to a non-signatory 
third party – the said third party cannot independently enforce its right.220 There is some 
legislation concerning rights granted to third parties, although typically relating to a 
specific area of law, such as insurance law. There is no legislation concerning the case at 
hand, however, in which case issues concerning the status of the third party are determined 
using general principles of law.
221
 
The signatory parties of the contract are regarded to have the right to, in addition to 
granting the right, cancel or alter the right afterwards.
222
 However, this right ceases when 
the third party beneficiary gets the aforementioned protected legal status. In the absence of 
specific legislation, the third party is regarded to gain such status with the signatory 
parties’ express stipulation in relation to the third party or a notice from the signatory 
parties to the non-signatory of the right granted.
223
 The protected status arising from notice 
                                           
216 See Hemmo 2007b, p. 408; Telaranta 1954, pp. 184-185; Hemmo 2007c, pp. 58-59. 
217 See Hakulinen 1965, p. 192. 
218 See Hemmo 2007b, p. 409; see also See Article 5.2.1 (1) of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (2010). 
219 See ibid. pp. 409-410. 
220 See Hakulinen 1965, p. 195. 
221 See Hemmo 2007b, p. 412. 
222 See ibid. 
223 See ibid.; Hakulinen 1965, p. 202; see also KKO 1932-II-175; KKO 1962-II-113. 
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protects the third party’s trust in the validity of the transaction. In KKO 2013:84, the non-
signatory party has had notice of the redemption right and has gained a protected legal 
status in the aforementioned fashion. Therefore, the question remains, did the signatory 
parties have the right to grant the benefit conditionally? 
The question leads to the principle of freedom of contract, which is the cornerstone and 
backbone of any contractual activity.
224
 It has been widely accepted e.g. in American legal 
literature and case law as well as in the majority of other countries that the parties’ freedom 
of contract dictates the formation and interpretation of the arbitration agreement.
225
 
Freedom of contract may be divided into the following elements: freedom to enter into 
contract, freedom to choose the contracting party, freedom of the type of contract, freedom 
of the content of contract, freedom of the form of contract and freedom of cancellation of 
contract.
226
 The fundamental idea is that parties are presumptively free to stipulate the 
contractual rights and obligations in relation to the elements above insofar as no specific 
restrictions are imposed by mandatory law.
227
 
Typical restrictions may arise with regard to consumer protection or the form of contract 
(e.g. in arbitration agreements). The determining factor is the purpose for which the 
freedom of the parties is restricted. When freedom of contract is the premise and 
restrictions are exceptions, all restrictions must be equivalent to the purpose they serve, as 
required by the principle of equity.
228
 For example, restrictions imposed on the basis of 
consumer protection are derived from the consumer’s subordinate position and inferior 
negotiation power in relation to the entrepreneur. Hence, more vigorous protection is 
necessitated than e.g. in business contracts, where the contract material based on the intent 
of the parties is regarded to be the focal factor as opposed to law.
229
 
When this train of thought is applied to third party benefits and the right of signatory 
parties to grant such benefits, it may be justifiably argued that grounds supporting any 
                                           
224 See Saarnilehto 2000, p. 81; Hemmo 2007a, p. 70; Hakulinen 1965, pp. 93-94. 
225 See Carbonneau 2007, pp. 21, 183-184: (“The Parties to the agreement could make whatever lawful 
stipulations they deemed appropriate”. See also e.g. Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Junior University 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 
514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
226 See Muukkonen 1956, pp. 607-608. However, this is only one way to segment the concept of freedom 
of contract, see Hemmo 2007a, p. 76. 
227 See Saarnilehto 2000, pp. 80-81; Hemmo 2007a, pp. 75-76. 
228 See Ervo 1996, pp. 48-51. 
229 See Hemmo 2007a, pp. 567-568. 
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restrictions on the right of the signatory parties to grant benefits as they please are elusive. 
This view relies on the fact that, despite the content of the benefit, the third party may 
choose to take it or leave it. Nevertheless, the signatory parties cannot impose obligations 
on the third party per se, which is why the third party needs no protection in the form 
discussed above. On the contrary, to restrict the signatory parties from granting the benefit 
conditionally would be detrimental to their freedom of contract with no justifiable purpose. 
The rights of the signatory parties to choose the means of dispute resolution and the 
purpose to settle all possible disputes in one forum (arbitration) instead of dividing them to 
several fora are reasonable as well as essential elements of arbitration. The fact that the 
parties decide to grant a benefit to a third party is trivial with regard to the aforementioned 
rights and invokes no need for protection of the non-signatory party. Moreover, as stated 
by Telaranta with regard to the judicial status of the third party beneficiary, 
“Dependent on the will of the party granting the right is not only whether the 
third party receives an independent right to claim through the stipulation, but 
also whether that right is formed comprehensively right away or only when 
certain prerequisites are met. This is because nothing seems to prevent the 
party granting the right from subsuming terms and conditions to his 
stipulation […].”230 (emphasis added) 
Further applying this argument to the case at hand, following from the aforementioned 
rationale and the inherent freedom of the signatory parties to stipulate on binding 
themselves in relation to third parties as well as from the absence of any definite 
restrictions imposed by law on the content of such stipulation, the conclusion may be 
drawn in the case of KKO 2013:84 that the premise has to be freedom of contract, i.e. 
freedom of the signatory parties to grant the right free of any restrictions as to the content 
of the right. Therefore, it may be concluded that the signatory parties were able to grant the 
right conditionally, and by invoking the right the non-signatory also became bound by the 
arbitration clause.
231
 This view is also supported by the Supreme Court precedent KKO 
2007:18 in which the Supreme Court stated that the arbitration clause was binding on the 
third party who was granted a right of first refusal. The difference to the case at hand is 
that in KKO 2013:84 there was no express stipulation. 
                                           
230 See Telaranta 1954, p. 206. 
231 The same result was reached in Göran H v Fritidsbolaget MCB AB (AD 1976 no 54). 
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Moreover, according to Hakulinen, 
“A third party right which is created directly by a stipulation of other parties 
in his benefit is not valid independently of the underlying contract”232 
(emphasis added). 
For example, the invalidity of the underlying contract affects the right granted therein as 
well. If the solid connection of these two factors is applied to KKO 2013:84, as self-
evident as it may sound, it appears that the third party right is dependent on the terms of 
the underlying contract as well as their validity. Therefore, since the arbitration agreement 
of the underlying contract in KKO 2013:84 is indeed valid, it will affect the right granted 
to the third party in case such condition is deemed to be the signatory parties’ intent. 
Since the signatory parties in KKO 2013:84 failed to expressly state that the right of 
redemption was subject to the arbitration clause, the question reverts to traditional contract 
interpretation: was it the signatory parties’ intent to grant the right of redemption 
conditionally? In juxtaposition with the next chapter, it may be pre-emptively revealed that 
in case the signatory parties were deemed to have intended to bind the non-signatory in the 
arbitration, the intent of the latter is insignificant and no consent on behalf of the non-
signatory is needed. The thesis will present its view on whether the existence of such intent 
in the case at hand may be found. However, this subject is adamantly related to the 
interpretation of the contract as well as party consent. Therefore, the result will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
  
                                           
232 See Hakulinen 1965, p. 205. 
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6 CONSENT AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
6.1 Introduction 
As a natural continuation of the previous chapter, the thesis will now examine the 
significance of party consent in arbitration, specifically in the light of KKO 2013:84. The 
reason is obvious: as stated above multiple times, arbitration is based on consensuality with 
regard to all parties involved, except of course in the exceptions discussed above.
233
 
Without consent there can be no agreement, and without agreement there can be no 
arbitration.
234
 After the evaluation on consent and intent has been concluded, the thesis will 
assess what role the doctrine of equitable estoppel may or should have played in the 
equation. This assessment is conducted in Chapter 6.4. 
The concepts of consent and intent are intertwined in the sense that the latter is needed to 
establish the former. Therefore, both concepts will be discussed in tandem. 
”When a court or an arbitral tribunal has to determine who is a party to an 
arbitration agreement, it will first determine – with more or less formalism – 
who has consented to the agreement. The consent may be express or implicit. 
In the latter case, the court or arbitral tribunal will base its determination on a 
close analysis of the facts of the case.”235 (emphasis added) 
 
As a general rule, party consent is an absolute necessity in arbitration. The existence of 
consent is determined using contract interpretation, as mentioned in Chapter 4.2. These 
determinations are naturally in the discretion of the competent court or arbitral tribunal and 
will be decided on a factual basis, case by case. 
 
When discussing consent in this Chapter, the thesis refers to implied consent (see Chapter 
4.4.3). In KKO 2013:84, the non-signatory did not expressly enunciate its consent, in 
which case the existence of potential consent must be determined in the light of the facts of 
the case juxtaposed with applicable rules of interpretation. As described above, implied 
consent may be discovered on the basis of the non-signatory’s conduct or alternatively by 
examination of the contract execution, i.e. by assessing the circumstantial premise of the 
                                           
233 E.g. equitable estoppel or veil piercing, see Chapters 4.4.5 and 4.4.6. 
234 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. 253. 
235 See Hanotiau 2006, p. 8. 
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case, the justifiable intentions and expectations of the parties and comparing these factors 
to potential protectable appropriate policies and alignments of the applicable area of law, in 
this case arbitration. However, this estimation is based on no exact rules but has to be 
conducted according to the specific circumstances of each case. Naturally, in KKO 
2013:84, when examining the intent of the signatories, both means of interpretation may be 
used. In comparison, the non-signatory’s consent may only be determined on the basis of 
subsequent conduct and target-oriented interpretation due to the fact that the non-signatory 
has not been present in the drafting or execution of the contract. Therefore, its reasonable 
expectations as to the agreement may not be assessed, but those concerning the approval of 
the agreement sometimes may. 
 
In KKO 2013:84, the Supreme Court took an unusual approach. Whereas in foreign legal 
literature and case law the relevant factors seem to be revolving around consent (which 
may be seen e.g. in the multiplicity of the doctrines used to bind non-signatories with the 
concept of consent) and whether it exists, the Supreme Court took into consideration 
mostly formal factors mentioned in the Finnish Arbitration Act
236
, which in fact favored 
not binding the non-signatory. However, the pivotal factor which in the Supreme Court’s 
eyes ultimately bound the non-signatory to the arbitration was the exigency of interpreting 
the underlying contract, the disputes arising out of which were to be settled in arbitration 
according to the arbitration clause. In other words, the Supreme Court took absolutely no 
notice in the prospect of consent. Therefore, according to this view, the existence of 
consent or alternatively the complete lack thereof seems to be tangential. 
 
The author considers this approach problematic. Even though establishing the existence of 
consent may not always be absolutely necessary (this subject is discussed below), it does 
play an essential role in arbitration agreements. Especially when there is the possibility that 
consent could be established, not contemplating it is peculiar. Therefore, the thesis will 
now discuss the establishment of consent with regard to KKO 2013:84 and whether it will 
provide legal justification for binding the non-signatory with reasonable grounds other than 
“just because”237. 
 
                                           
236 These factors include e.g. the lack of formal agreement as provided in section 3 and the non-
applicability of the ways to bind non-signatories as provided in section 4 of the act. 
237 Here the author refers to the Supreme Court’s (scarcely argumented) rationale which bound the non-
signatory to the arbitration with a rather frail connection. 
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6.1.1 “Existence” and “extension” of the agreement and the relevance of terminology 
Before further discussing the formation of consent in the light of the case at hand, it is 
worthwhile to consider the meaning of terminology in the matter. As aptly described by 
Park, 
“When a non-signatory denies having consented to arbitrate, the very 
existence of that contract remains at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”238 
However, the concept is ambiguous in the sense that even when the existence of the 
arbitration agreement between the signatory and the non-signatory party is undermined, 
there in fact has to be a valid arbitration agreement (between the signatory parties). The 
formal requirements, as asserted above
239
, determine the existence of that very agreement. 
However, when the non-signatory disputes the existence of such agreement in relation to 
itself, while also denying the competence of the arbitral tribunal (with reference to 
competence-competence) it is in fact also repudiating the subjective scope (ratione 
personae) of the agreement which nevertheless does exist in reality, denying that its effects 
are extended to the non-signatory. The conceptual involution is incisively described by 
Born: 
“[…] the courts' “interpretation” of the arbitration clause is in fact more of a 
procedural, preliminary view, not directed to the merits of what the 
agreement actually provides, but only towards the question of who should 
decide this issue in the first instance. This is in fact an application of the 
competence-competence doctrine, not a definitive interpretation of the 
parties' agreement.”240 (emphasis added) 
However, the subjective scope of the arbitration agreement determines its existence in 
relation to the non-signatory. Therefore, while practically being only semantics, it may be 
misleading to discuss disputing the existence of such agreement, but rather refer to 
assessment of the scope of the agreement. The effect of these concepts and the means they 
employ are naturally the same – the lack of consent of the non-signatory leads to non-
existence of the arbitration agreement in relation to it (although not between the signatory 
parties). However, since the prerequisite for interpreting a contract is that such contract as 
                                           
238 See Newman-Hill 2008, p. 563. 
239 See Chapter 5.2.1 
240 See Born 2009, p. 1081. 
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a whole exists, to base the assessment, e.g. in KKO 2013:84, on the existence of the 
arbitration agreement between the signatories and the non-signatory would as a matter of 
terminology be rather confusing. Be as it may, the question is nonetheless one concerning 
the jurisdiction and whether it belongs to the court of the arbitral tribunal, but it is useful to 
acknowledge the different factors and formulations linked with each term and the effects 
thereof. 
Moreover, even though the aforementioned separation between the existence and 
subjective scope is indeed relevant and different opinions have been presented on the 
subject
241
, the practical applications remain the same. It may be argued that, even if the 
question was regarded to be that of the existence of the arbitration agreement (which, in a 
way, it indeed is), the interpretation and use of the following principles is done to 
determine the intent of the parties (which typically transpires from the agreement as well as 
the factual circumstances). Therefore, even during the formal non-existence of the contract 
between the signatory and the non-signatory and despite the fact that contract interpretation 
requires an existing contract, it may still be used as a tool to identify the (signatory) 
parties’ true intent. 
Another specious expression is “extension” of the arbitration agreement. As discussed by 
Born and Hanotiau
242
, the term “extension” implies that the arbitration agreement would 
reach beyond its legitimate sphere of influence. It is evident that the arbitration agreement 
may only concern those who have consented to arbitrate: it “records the consent of the 
parties to submit to arbitration”243 (emphasis added) all or some disputes. Therefore, 
extension provides for a misleading term in a matter which in reality is merely about 
identifying the actual parties to the arbitration agreement.
244
 The dividing factor is the lack 
of signature or other express form of contract execution – instead, the formal execution has 
been replaced by consent in one form or another. The issue may be regarded as “mostly a 
question of terminology”245, but it does carry practical significance. The same 
fallaciousness may be linked to the term “third parties”, which also seems to refer to 
                                           
241 See e.g. Rau 2008, p. 245 (“Treating any of this as a question ‘rationae personis’ is already highly 
tendentious”). The author begs to differ. 
242 See Born 2009, pp. 1138-1139; Hanotiau 2011, p. 554. 
243 See Redfern-Hunter 2009, p. 85. 
244 See Van den Berg 2007, p. 343; Hobér 2011, pp. 96-97. 
245 See Hobér 2011, p. 97 
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someone not related to the agreement.
246
 In this case, the construct of “non-signatory 
(party)” undoubtedly carries a more distinctive meaning as it refers to an actual party who 
has merely omitted or had no chance to sign a written agreement.
247
 
It may be questioned whether the exact terminology is of great importance. However, as 
this chapter examines establishing the arbitration agreement through doctrines which rely 
on consent, it is necessary to be aware of how these doctrines and the actual effects thereof 
are construed. These effects and the issue in general become relevant in practical 
applications, such as the enforcement of the award. For example, the New York 
Convention only recognizes and enforces awards between “the parties”.248 As for KKO 
2013:84, this question is particularly troublesome because the wording of the Supreme 
Court seems to suggest that the non-signatory did not in fact become a party to the 
arbitration agreement but was “merely” bound by it. This subject will be discussed below 
in Chapter 7.1. 
 
6.2 Means of finding consent 
“In many cases an implicit understanding on the part of the signatories as to 
who the ‘true’ parties ‘really’ were, should be enough to trump any other 
requirement, substantive or formal.”249 
As conveniently conveyed above by Rau, the existence of consent may ultimately be 
established through interpretation of party intent. In case it may be found that the signatory 
parties intended to include the non-signatory party within the extent of the arbitration 
clause, the non-signatory may be bound as presented in Chapter 5.3. This ensues from the 
concept that the non-signatory may not only pick the cherry – it must also eat the 
(assumingly unpalatable) cake. However, the intent of the non-signatory may carry 
significance as well in the sense that, even if the non-signatories were deemed not to have 
meant to impose arbitration as a condition to the benefit
250
, the non-signatory may be 
                                           
246 See Born 2009, p. 1139. 
247 The use of the term “non-signatory” has also been criticized for its “laziness” and for its omission to “do 
justice to the problem”; see Rau 2008, p. 229. 
248 See Article II (1) of the New York Convention. 
249 See Rau 2008, p. 231. 
250 Based on the research material, the conditional granting of a benefit is discussed scarcely in legal 
literature. However, for case law, see e.g. See e.g., Federico v. Charterers Mut. Assur. Ass’n Ltd, 158 
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regarded to have accepted being subjected to arbitration by accepting the benefit.
251
 
Moreover, finding non-signatory consent is important also due to the following notion: 
“A third party beneficiary might in certain circumstances have the power to 
sue under a contract; it certainly cannot be bound to a contract it did not sign 
or otherwise assent to.”252 
While the author of this thesis disagrees with the view that a non-signatory may only be 
bound to arbitration it has assented to (at least if assent in this case constitutes an express 
stipulation), the existence of consent is important as there is no mechanism similar e.g. to 
estoppel readily usable in Finland.
 253
 Therefore, the typical rules and principles of contract 
interpretation and how implicit party consent may be discovered must be established. 
However, as a premise, the legal basis based on which the interpretation is conducted must 
be restated. International conventions or national laws (including the Finnish Arbitration 
Act) do not dispense advice on the interpretation of arbitration agreements, other than in 
the form of giving effect to the scope of the parties’ agreement and providing for the non-
recognition of awards which exceed this scope.
254
 In the absence of such rules, the 
universally established view refers the interpreters of arbitration agreements to the general 
rules and principles of contract law.
255
 Naturally, when a national court considers a case 
based on national law, it has to seek the answers from the national law in question.  
However, several international arbitral tribunals have adopted transnational, “generally-
applicable canons of contract”.256 Apart from some specific requirements, e.g. concerning 
the form of agreement, arbitration is a creature of contract, which is why normal rules of 
contract interpretation apply. Nevertheless, even then there are some special characteristics 
                                                                                                                               
F.Supp.2d 565 2001 (“arbitration as a condition precedent to recovery”). This further begs for finding 
non-signatory consent. 
251 Naturally, if the signatory parties are regarded to have specifically excluded the non-signatory from 
arbitration, it ensues that, regardless of the non-signatory’s intent, the non-signatory is neither bound 
nor may invoke the arbitration clause. 
252 See Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). 
253 The existence of consent once again appears to be a vague concept. Excluding situations where 
equitable estoppel has been invoked, even if assent by the non-signatory beneficiary cannot be 
established by other means (especially in the case of a very reluctant non-signatory), in case the 
benefit has been granted conditionally, does accepting the benefit with no express resistance as to the 
condition in fact constitute assent? 
254 See e.g. Born 2009, pp. 1061-1062. 
255 See e.g. Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. 265; Lew 2003, p. 150; Born 2009, pp. 1063-1065. This subject and 
its legal justification is discussed more thoroughly above in Chapter 5.3.1. 
256 See Born 2009, p. 1063. 
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to arbitration agreements that are considered to affect their interpretation, e.g. in the case of 
liberal construction of the agreement or the pro-arbitration regime (discussed below).
257
 
Due to this specific nature or arbitration, some typical rules of interpretation may not 
apply.
258
 In conclusion, interpretation of arbitration agreements is a mixture of general 
rules of (national) contract law and special rules unique to arbitration in particular. 
Moreover, using rules of contract interpretation to examine party intent and consent in 
relation to the signatory parties is naturally justifiable as the signatory is expressly bound 
by the contract and the contract may be used to identify the signatory’s intent. However, 
the same rules are applied to discovering non-signatory intent as well because they reflect 
both how intent typically manifests itself and what are the justifiable expectations typically 
connected with arbitration agreements. Furthermore, it is a question of determining 
whether the non-signatory has approved the contract in invoking the right granted therein, 
to which the rules of contract interpretation apply. 
Another thing that affects and complicates the interpretation of arbitration agreements is 
that they are typically in the form of a short, ambiguous arbitration clause which only 
contains some rudimentary stipulations on the arbitration process. If for example a clause 
stating “Arbitration under Finnish law” is enforceable, it does not provide much insight to 
the intent of the parties. Therefore, certain presumptions of the parties’ intentions have 
emerged with the purpose of clarifying the typical goals often connected to arbitration.
259
 
The thesis will therefore examine the essential rules and presumptions applicable to 
interpretation of arbitration agreements. 
First, however, it is useful to state the systematics connected to the rules of interpretation. 
It is universally accepted that the (common) intent of the parties is the overriding rule of 
interpretation.
260
 This intent may typically be discerned from the wording of the contract 
and other material connected to it. Interpretation based on this material is subjective, party-
oriented, since these are the factors which bespeak party intent. However, sometimes the 
intentions of the parties are not congruent. In these cases where common intent does not 
                                           
257 See Born 2009, p. 1060. 
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exist, the question arises whether one party’s intent may be given preference. Some 
guidance for interpreting party intent may and has been found in section 32.1 of the 
Finnish Contracts Act which regulates mistakes in the utterance of contracts.
261
 Under the 
provision, the party who is or should have been aware of such mistake made by the other 
party may not rely on the mistake. The purpose of the provision is regarded to give priority 
to the intent of the opposing party if the other party knew or should have known of this 
intent.
262
 This notion is supported internationally.
263
 Furthermore, if no such awareness 
exists, the other party’s intent and conduct are given the meaning which a reasonable 
person would have given it under similar circumstances.
264
 
The secondary method of interpretation is objective, target-oriented. It may be used in case 
the primary (aforementioned) party-oriented interpretation is not sufficient or as 
supplementing guidelines.
265
 Target-oriented interpretation may take into consideration 
factors such as non-mandatory law, legal policies, promoting the feasibility of a certain 
type of contracts as well as target-oriented interpretation rules, e.g. pro-arbitration rules, 
effective interpretation, contra proferentem and matters of expediency.
266
 These are means 
to discover the meaning and content that the parties should reasonably have understood the 
contract to entail.
267
 
 
6.2.1 Pro-arbitration presumption vs strict interpretation 
One of the most essential (as well as contradictory) presumptions concerning arbitration 
agreements is the so called “pro-arbitration” presumption. Deriving from international 
conventions, e.g. New York Convention, as well as national legislation and case law, the 
presumption promotes a general “expansive” interpretation of arbitration agreements.268 
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The pro-arbitration regime, adopted widely by developed states and the international 
business community, recognizes the presumptive validity and enforceability of arbitration 
agreements as well as limits the available grounds for their invalidity.
269
 Also called 
“presumption of one-stop arbitration”270 or interpretation “in favorem validitatis”271 or “in 
favorem jurisdictionis”272, the rule of interpretation presumes that the parties intended the 
arbitration clause to be interpreted expansively and in ambiguous situations extend to cover 
related disputes as well as those clearly defined in the clause.
273
 The idea behind the 
presumption is that the parties may be assumed to have intended all possible disputes 
arising from the contract to be settled in a single proceeding as opposed to taking on 
multiple processes in different fora. The presumption is rather fair as it promotes the 
effective resolution of disputes as well as encourages the view that the parties intended to 
stipulate the resolution of all related disputes rather than only certain types. 
The pro-arbitration presumption has been adopted widely especially in the United States
274
. 
Supported by the Federal Arbitration Act
275
, the view has also been reasserted by courts, 
e.g. in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co: 
“[A]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it 
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute; and doubts 
should be resolved in favor of coverage”276 (emphasis added) 
The presumption favoring wide interpretation is also predominant e.g. in Switzerland, 
England, Germany, Italy and Canada.
277
 However, some authorities, e.g. the French Cour 
de cassation, have declined to employ the expansive view, and instead decided that the 
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ambiguous provisions of the arbitration agreement shall be interpreted with a more neutral 
standpoint.
278
 
The pro-arbitration presumption has not been around particularly long. It was preceded by 
the rule of strict interpretation, according to which arbitration agreements were to be 
construed narrowly.
279
 The presumption is based on the notion that arbitration is an 
exception to the premise that disputes are resolved by national courts according to due 
process.
280
 Accordingly, the arbitration agreement is to be interpreted in the way that only 
such matters as expressly stipulated by the parties are to be subjected to arbitration. 
Therefore, in ambiguous and equivocal situations, no presumed intentions should be given 
to the agreement. In the absence of express wording, such unclear matters cannot be 
arbitrated.
281
 
A fine line may be (and was) found, e.g. in the aforementioned decision of Cour de 
cassation, in which the court concluded that neither the strict interpretation nor 
interpretation in favorem validitatis serves the true purpose of the question at hand.
282
 To 
interpret the arbitration agreement strictly was regarded old fashioned and not suitable for 
the modern legal environment which no longer recoils from arbitration as the evil step 
brother of litigation. Furthermore, to deny all claims which are not backed up by express 
wording in the agreement would first of all be conflicting with the notion that the intent of 
the parties typically overcomes the wording of the agreement
283
 (although discerning such 
intent may prove to be troublesome), and secondly, it would seriously impede arbitration 
due to the broad and non-specific nature of arbitration clauses. However, the expansive 
interpretation was not deeded appropriate either because it assumes that the parties intend 
everything to be arbitrated, whereas it is “perfectly legitimate” to go for litigation 
                                           
278 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, pp. 261-262; see also Born 2009, pp. 1076-1078. 
279 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, p. Tirkkonen 1943, pp. 101–103; Möller 1997, p. 30; Kurkela-Uoti 1994, p. 
7. See also e.g. Gangel v. De Groot, 393 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. 1977) as cited in Born 2009, p. 1078: 
“[t]he agreement to arbitrate must be express, direct, and unequivocal as to the issues or disputes to 
be submitted to arbitration”. 
280 See Koulu 2008, p. 188. 
281 See e.g. Möller 1984, p. 374. 
282 See Gaillard-Savage 1999, pp. 259-262. 
283 See Hemmo 2007a, pp. 621-623; Article 4.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (2010); Article 5.101 of the Principles of European Contract Law (2002). 
 
 
62 
 
instead.
284
 Moreover, to automatically assume as a matter of policy that the arbitration 
agreement is valid, effective and extensive does have its pitfalls. 
Even so, although the expansive (pro-arbitration) interpretation cannot be regarded 
completely universally accepted nor entirely free of doubt, seeing that it has been 
internationally adopted more and more comprehensively and the formerly dominant 
restrictive view has been “generally rejected in international arbitration”285, it is safe to 
assume that the preferable option is interpreting the agreement expansively rather than 
restrictively. This argument relies on the fact that the modern business environment no 
longer considers arbitration as an exception to the premise of litigation but, on the contrary, 
the typical form of dispute resolution in business, whether national or (especially) 
international. Moreover, even if a neutral starting point may be regarded justifiable, the 
argument (and presumption) that if an arbitration clause has been made in the first place, it 
is likely meant to cover all disputes, is intelligible and reasonable. 
It should be mentioned briefly that, once again, the terminology discussed above seems to 
carry some importance. The extensive as well as the restrictive interpretation both apply to 
the assessment of the scope of the arbitration agreement, not its validity, i.e. the existence 
of the agreement.
286
 Even though the non-signatory in KKO 2013:84 resisted arbitration 
relying on the non-existence of the arbitration agreement between it and the signatory 
parties, the argument may be disregarded as semantics. As asserted above in Chapter 6.1.1, 
the existence of the arbitration agreement is not in question in KKO 2013:84 – the 
agreement, its validity measuring up to the formal requirements of the Finnish Arbitration 
Act, does exists between the signatory parties. The issue of whether it “extends” to bind 
the non-signatory as well (which, to be fair, determines whether the agreement exists 
between the signatory B and the non-signatory C) concerns the subjective scope of said 
agreement which will be determined on the basis of the intent of the parties. As the intent 
will be established using normal contract interpretation, the aforementioned presumption 
does apply in the case at hand. Therefore, even though it may be argued that “This rule [of 
extensive interpretation] can apply only once it has been ascertained that the parties 
actually agreed on arbitration”287 (emphasis added), this argument is countered in KKO 
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2013:84 by the fact that the interpretation  refers mainly to the signatory parties’ intent and 
only supportively to the non-signatory’s. Since the object of assessment is the intended 
subjective scope of the agreement, the rule of interpretation may apply.  
 
6.2.2 Interpretation in good faith 
According to Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, 
“The first and most widely accepted principle of interpretation applied to 
arbitration agreements is the principle of interpretation in good faith.”288 
Parallel with the rule of interpretation favoring party intent (if one can be discerned) over 
the wording of contract
289
, the principle of good faith gives preference to the parties’ true 
intent in case it conflicts with the worded intent and presupposes that the contracting 
parties enter into agreement with the intention that the stipulations of the contract are 
binding and that both (or all) parties have intended for the subsequent consequences.
290
 
The principle of good faith and fair dealing has also been articulated in the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts as “one of the fundamental ideas 
underlying the Principles”.291 
Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman divide the principle of good faith into three more exact 
rules of construction of party intent.
292
 First of all, the examination of party intent must be 
conducted in context, which refers to taking into consideration the justifiable expectations 
that the parties envisaged when entering into the agreement. Assumingly the consideration 
in context also includes reflecting these expectations to the circumstances of the execution 
of contract. Secondly, the perception of the parties towards the agreement and its 
objectives may be deduced from their attitude (and actions reflecting the attitude) between 
the time of the signing and the moment the dispute arises. The use of this “practical and 
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quasi-authentic interpretation” has been common in international arbitration293, e.g. in the 
Aramco case.
294
 
However, as will be discussed below, the significance of such subsequent conduct may be 
reduced when juxtaposed alongside the typical offer-reply mechanism and the time of 
formation of an agreement. Considering this composition, the defining factor is the intent 
of the parties at the time of contract execution, while the subsequent attitude and conduct is 
considered to be of lesser (if any) significance, especially if it does not reflect the attitude 
of both parties.
295
 Although in KKO 2013:84, the issue concerns a non-signatory – a 
situation based on the premise that no agreement (with the non-signatory) exists – the 
offer-reply mechanism is relevant in determining the acceptance or adoption of the 
agreement by the non-signatory beneficiary in case the benefit is granted conditionally. 
Lastly, under the third rule of good faith interpretation, the agreement shall be interpreted 
as a whole. Although criticized to some extent for circularity, e.g. in case of related 
contracts,
296
 the concept of interpreting as a whole is commonly recognized.
297
 
 
6.2.3 Effective interpretation 
Under the principle of effective interpretation (effete utile), when the wording of the 
agreement raises the question whether the intent to arbitrate exists or not (e.g. in a 
pathological, optional arbitration clause), weight should be given to the interpretation 
which results in the arbitration clause being effective rather than one which “renders them 
useless or nonsensical”.298 In other words, the principle relying on consent assumes that 
parties who have included an arbitration clause in their contract have intended that the 
clause is also effective (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).
299
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It is noteworthy that Waincymer asserts that the principle of effective interpretation is well 
suited for evaluating the existence of the arbitration agreement, but not so much as to the 
subjective scope thereof because “there typically is no starting point where that person can 
be presumed to want a valid arbitration”.300 While this is true in the sense that the non-
signatory is typically not present when the arbitration agreement is drafted and therefore 
any determination as to the non-signatory’s intent is obviously futile, the principle may be 
deemed to carry significance when considering whether the signatory parties meant to 
include the non-signatory beneficiary in the scope of the arbitration agreement. Although 
this topic will be discussed below, it may already be stated briefly that it would be rather 
peculiar if the signatories deliberately wanted to exclude the non-signatory from possible 
arbitration proceedings and thus possibly subject themselves to multiple proceedings in 
several fora. 
 
6.2.4 Interpretation contra proferentem 
The principle of interpretation contra proferentem (against the offeror/draftsman) refers to 
the universally recognized principle that the party who is responsible for drafting the 
ambiguous or equivocal contract provision should be responsible for the ambiguity, 
leading to the provision being interpreted against it.
301
 The principle is based on the idea 
that the draftsman would have had the opportunity to phrase the provision so that no 
confusion as to its meaning arises, whereas the opposing party could not have influenced it. 
Naturally, this rule, typically applied in cases of standard terms and conditions, does not 
apply when parties have drafted the agreement together. 
In KKO 2013:84, the District Court and the Court of Appeal (without specifically 
mentioning this principle) did both refer to the fact that the signatory parties did indeed 
have the opportunity to expressly bind the non-signatory by a more specific arbitration 
clause. Indeed it may be noted that in the case at hand, the circumstances are lucid since 
the crucial provision, the arbitration clause, was drafted by the signatories alone. 
Therefore, the prerequisites as to applying the contra proferentem rule are met. 
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Some criticism may and has been presented towards this rule of interpretation. First of all, 
the author is of the opinion that it may sometimes place undue pressure on the drafting 
party and does not really encourage one to take on the task. Another opinion points out that 
the rule in fact encourages the other party not to remark the draftsman on an ambiguous 
term.
302
 However, this criticism does not apply to the case at hand because the non-
signatory had nothing to do with the contract. 
Lastly, the contra proferentem rule is not absolute. It must be taken into consideration how 
the ambiguity of the provision in question manifests itself in relation to the other party. For 
example, the text itself may be written in poor English or the concepts and terms used may 
be extremely complex. The defining factor in determining whether the rule favors the party 
who has not drafted the provision is how that party within reason should have understood 
said provision in juxtaposition e.g. with the type of contract or how such provisions or 
contracts are typically formed.
303
 
 
6.2.5 Interpretation according to customary practice 
Finally, in case the provision of a contract is equivocal, it may be interpreted according to 
the customary practice or trade usage.
304
 This means that the provision will be given a 
meaning that is typically connected with similar provisions or contracts in the established 
business practice. As presented in the Principles of European Contract Law, the meaning 
should be that which “reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties would give to it in 
the same circumstances”.305 In case the party representing the competing view does not 
show why that view is better suited for interpretation in the issue in question, the view 
supporting the customary practice will prevail.
306
 
The justification of this rule of interpretation may be found in the idea that it reflects the 
presumed intent that the parties have meant for the provision to have. Therefore, yet 
possibly controversial in the sense that the aforementioned presumption might be wrong 
                                           
302 See Hemmo 2007a, p. 639. 
303 See Hemmo 2007a, pp. 642-643. See also e.g. KKO 1990:120. 
304 See Born 2009, p. 1065; Aho 1968, p. 255; Hemmo 2007a, pp. 650-651, 592-594. See also KKO 
1995:171. 
305 See Article 5:101 (3) of the Principles of European Contract Law. 
306 See Hemmo 2007a, p. 594 
 
 
67 
 
and the parties’ intention was in fact unusual, it does provide support for establishing party 
intent since unusual or abnormal practices would normally be expressly stipulated. 
 
6.3 Interpretation of consent in KKO 2013:84 
Moving on to apply these methods of interpretation discussed above to KKO 2013:84, the 
first step is to present the only piece of written material that may be used to evaluate the 
parties’ intent. The arbitration clause, included in the “dispute resolution” paragraph of 
signatory parties’ underlying contract was the following307: 
“Disputes arising out of this contract will primarily be settled in negotiations 
with the intent of reaching an equitable resolution congruent with the purpose 
of the contract which satisfies all parties. In case no resolution is reached, the 
disputes shall be settled in arbitration.” 
Typically, the material used for the interpretation of contract or intent includes the physical 
contract and possible attachments, such as drafts, plans, calculations or letters.
308
 In 
addition, the evaluation may be based on subsequent conduct, previous contractual 
practices of the parties as well as customary practice in the area of business in question. 
However, in KKO 2013:84, the material available for interpreting the signatory parties’ 
intent as well as the non-signatory’s is scarce. The only material that indicates anything as 
to the purpose of the parties is the underlying agreement and the arbitration clause. It is 
therefore also the only material that may be used for party-oriented interpretation. 
Excluding that material, the evaluation will have to be based on presumptions, reasonable 
expectations and customary practices – methods of target-oriented interpretation. 
As for the semantics, however, the author asserts that the distinction between party-
oriented and target-oriented interpretation is somewhat artificial as the concepts may 
factually overlap, e.g. in this case. For example, the rule of interpretation in good faith 
attempts to discover the true intent of the parties. However, as explained above, its 
methods include taking into account the expectations justifiably envisaged by the parties, 
which in turn refer to and are determined on the basis of customary practices and 
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presumptions connected to the specific area of law, e.g. the pro-arbitration presumption. 
That is to say, expectations do affect party intent, and the concept of “a reasonable 
person”309 is heavily influenced by what is typically expected of such person, which in turn 
is determined by policies and presumptions. In other words, “reasonable” intent is 
determined by policies, which is why this thesis will not concentrate on distinguishing 
between these rationales of interpretation, but merely acknowledging them and how they 
are typically perceived. 
The factual situation in KKO 2013:84 differs from the typical premise in the way that the 
non-signatory beneficiary naturally has had nothing to do with drafting the contract or the 
arbitration clause contained therein. Therefore, the clause may only be used to interpret the 
signatory parties’ intent, whereas the non-signatory’s intent will have to be based solely on 
its subsequent conduct (insofar as it matters) and reasonable expectations. 
For the sake of clarity and the slightly divergent methods and materials of interpretation of 
the signatories’ intent and that of the non-signatory, the thesis will first discuss the intent of 
the signatory parties and draw conclusions on what the results denote. As stated in Chapter 
5.3.2, the intent of the signatory parties carries most relevance in the matter, as they may 
have meant to impose the arbitration clause as a condition to the benefit granted in the 
underlying shareholders’ agreement. 
 
6.3.1 Discovering signatory intent 
Wording 
The wording of the arbitration clause is, as stated above, generic and rather non-specific. 
Such construction of dispute resolution clauses is typical as the focus is often on the other 
substance of the underlying agreement. Interpretation of the scope of an arbitration 
agreement is delicate and the lines drawn are thin; however, typically, special attention is 
paid to whether the clause refers to disputes arising e.g. “under”, “out of” or “in relation 
to” or “in connection with” the underlying agreement.310 In KKO 2013:84, the exact 
wording is “arising out of”311, which has traditionally been regarded to merit a rather broad 
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interpretation – broader than “arising under” yet narrower than “arising in connection 
with”.312 For example, the ICC standard clause of arbitration states “All disputes arising 
out of or in connection with the present contract […]”313 (emphasis added) and the 
UNCITRAL model arbitration clause states “Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising 
out of or relating to this contract”314 (emphasis added). At this point it must be noted, 
however, that even though this type of interpretation is typically applied to deciding 
whether a form of dispute (e.g. torts, contractual and non-contractual claims) is within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, the same interpretation nonetheless provides indication 
as to the parties’ intent concerning the subjective brevity of the clause. Therefore, applying 
the same methods in interpreting the scope ratione personae is justifiable. 
Furthermore, in addition to the phrase “arising out of” typically being linked to broad 
interpretation, it may be asked whether the exact wording can conclusively be the 
determinative factor, especially when the clause is generically broad and ambiguous. The 
capability of “normal persons” to pay attention to such detail, especially if they are not 
accustomed to such legal jargon, is presumably limited and the (slight) differences in 
wording may be regarded “semantic”315. Moreover, the dominant view seems consider the 
fact that the parties refer disputes to arbitration in the first place as a strong indication of 
their willingness to settle all disputes in such fashion.
316
 Well phrased by Born, 
“The intent of leading model international arbitration clauses is to apply 
expansively to all disputes relating to a particular contract, regardless of legal 
formulation. That is consistent with the practical objective of providing a 
single, neutral and expert forum for efficiently resolving the parties' disputes. 
As already discussed, fine distinctions in wording are artificial, or worse, 
obscuring the underlying commercial purposes of agreements to arbitrate.”317 
(emphasis added) 
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This view obviously relies on the notion of pro-arbitration and the assumption that the 
parties have actually intended to arbitrate all possible disputes. Naturally, this assumption 
may be countered by suggesting that this presumption is biased or ignorant to the 
possibility and autonomy of the parties to decide whatever they choose, which is obviously 
true. The parties may well have intended to spread the resolution of possible disputes all to 
their own fora, all with different procedures and in all corners of the Earth. However, such 
presumption must rely on extremely cogent argumentation and factual evidence.  It would 
also seem fair to expect that the parties would expressly stipulate such unusual desires. 
Therefore, in the presence of a broad arbitration clause
318
, as long as the wording does not 
expressly stipulate or give strong indications as to the exclusion of certain types of 
disputes, it may be justifiably expected (as it is the normal practice) that the parties have 
intended to arbitrate every possible dispute. This presumption may naturally be disputed, 
but the disputing party defending the anomalous view must carry the burden of proof. 
Applying this interpretation to the case at hand, it may be assumed that, by stipulating on 
“disputes arising out of” the underlying agreement, the parties have intended to subject to 
arbitration everything in connection with the agreement regardless of the subjective 
dimension. This argument is supported by the rationale of the Supreme Court in KKO 
2013:84, under which the dispute was to be settled in arbitration because it necessitated 
interpretation and application of a provision in the agreement, i.e. arose out of the 
agreement. Neither does the precise wording of the clause indicate that the signatory 
parties intended to leave the third party outside of the arbitration.  Moreover, it would be 
unreasonable and unrealistic to assume that the parties had taken into account the 
possibility that perhaps the arbitration clause was not clear or wide enough to include non-
signatory parties as well. Therefore, the argument of the District Court that the parties had 
the option to expressly bind the non-signatory beneficiary seems to expect quite a lot of 
legal knowledge and insight to arbitral dispute resolution from the parties. However, since 
the wording of the arbitration clause is indeed generic and vague, the conclusion will have 
to be based on other rationales as well. Still, it is now established which is the preferable 
way to construe the arbitration clause in KKO 2013:84, what kind of assessment it may be 
subjected to and which is the preferable conclusion as to the intent of the signatory parties 
based on the wording of the clause. 
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Good faith, pro-arbitration, expediency and other considerations 
As discussed above in relation to interpretation in good faith, intent of the parties must be 
interpreted in context and construed in the light of the expectations they have reasonable 
envisaged. In KKO 2013:84, there are no indications as to any unusual or abnormal 
expectations or purpose of the parties, which is demonstrated e.g. by the generic arbitration 
clause. Therefore, the interpretation may not rely on any other factual evidence, but must 
instead employ the standard of “reasonable” expectations which in turn are affected by 
presumptions connected to arbitration. 
First of all, reference to the rationale presented by Lord Hoffmann in Premium Nafta 
Products may be made: 
“In my opinion the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the 
assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have 
intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have 
entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal. The clause 
should be construed in accordance with this presumption unless the language 
makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded from the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction.” 319 (emphasis added) 
The opinion presents valid argumentation in support of the pro-arbitration presumption, 
which the thesis, succumbing to the universally dominant view, as stated above, regards as 
the preferable premise. It is likely that parties who have agreed to arbitration have intended 
the coverage of such agreement to be extensive since, absent evidence to the contrary, it 
would indeed be irrational to assume that the parties wanted to engage several proceedings 
in multiple jurisdictions, possibly at the same time. 
Opinions differ on the subject of applying the pro-arbitration presumption. However, even 
if the presumption is not perfect in its prejudice, it is supported by other considerations 
used to determine what may be expected from arbitration in general. First of all, matters of 
expediency as well as customary practice strongly favor the pro-arbitration presumption. 
The parties who have in general agreed to arbitration may be regarded not to wish to divide 
the resolution of possible disputes to several fora. Since one of the most important reasons 
                                           
319 Premium Nafta Products Limited v Fili Shipping Company Limited [2007] UKHL 40, cited in Waincymer 
2012, pp. 144-145. 
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to agree to arbitration in general is the efficiency of the process – it is considered speedy 
and cost-effective
320
 in comparison with traditional litigation with all its appellant 
proceedings – and the exclusion of litigation as means of any dispute resolution, it would 
be a stretch to suggest that the signatory parties only wanted these benefits in relation to 
each other and not in relation to the third party beneficiary. Moreover, the intent of the 
parties is typically to have a centralized means of dispute resolution, which is also 
adamantly connected to cost-efficiency and timeliness or the proceedings. In other words, 
to presume the opposite would be quite unconventional, and as an exception to the rule it 
would have to be supported by strong argumentation as well as evidence. Therefore, the 
burden of proof would lie on the party suggesting such approach. 
In addition, the principle of effective interpretation supports the view under which the 
intent of the signatory parties was to bind the non-signatory as well. Applying effective 
interpretation in KKO 2013:84, it is likely that the signatories have intended the arbitration 
clause to be effective to its full extent, i.e. in relation to all parties, including the non-
signatory. It is reasonable to assume that the signatories have acknowledged that by 
granting a benefit to a third party they obligate themselves in relation to said non-
signatory. This in turn may entitle the non-signatory to a rightful claim, enabling it to 
commence proceedings against them. Therefore, it may also be assumed that the 
signatories intended the arbitration clause to be effective in relation to all such persons or 
entities that may be a part of such proceedings arising out of the shareholders’ agreement. 
Accordingly, it would impede the efficiency of the clause to limit it to only affect the 
signatory parties, especially when the signatories have been aware of the third party 
connected to the underlying agreement. 
However, it is necessary to also take into account the rule of interpretation contra 
proferentem, under which an ambiguous contract provision is to be interpreted against the 
draftsman. In the case at hand, this principle would support the view of the District Court, 
according to which the signatories had the option of expressly binding the non-signatory, 
and in not doing so they forfeited the right to arbitrate with it. Indeed, applying this 
principle would lead to the detriment of the signatories as they alone are responsible for 
drafting the clause. Moreover, in case of a third party beneficiary, it would be reasonable to 
expect that the signatories expressly stipulated in detail of every aspect of their relations to 
                                           
320 This view may and has been argued, but that discussion is left outside the scope of this work. 
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the third party, exactly because the third party (assumingly) had no chance of influencing 
the contract itself. This view encourages and is supported by the predictability of contracts. 
Even then, however, it would be rather harsh to leave without significance the rationales 
supporting the other conclusion and decide the case against the signatories only because 
they did not realize they should pay more attention to the wording of the contract. As 
stated above, such conclusion would be expecting a lot from the signatories in terms of 
legal and contractual knowledge as well as being disproportionately harsh in juxtapose 
with the purpose of the principle (of contra proferentem) and all other aforementioned 
considerations. 
All in all, taking into account the arguments above as well as the preference given to 
arbitration by the pro-arbitration presumption (or, in other words, the presumption of a 
“normal” or “reasonable person”); it may be assumed that the signatory parties in KKO 
2013:84 have indeed intended to bind the non-signatory to arbitration as well. The fact that 
they have not been judicially enlightened enough to add an express stipulation of such 
intent cannot be regarded to constitute grounds for rejecting such view, especially when it 
is supported by almost all of the other considerations that may be taken into account. 
Therefore, the intent of the signatory parties is established. 
 
6.3.2 Discovering non-signatory intent 
Now that the reasonable assumption of the signatory parties’ intent has been established in 
the case at hand, the thesis moves on to assess whether the non-signatory beneficiary may 
be deemed to have consented to arbitration. Since the non-signatory has not been present in 
drafting the arbitration clause or the underlying agreement, its intent shall be assessed in 
the light of its subsequent conduct and, absent any proof of such, reasonable expectations 
and presumptions concerning a normal person in a similar situation. These considerations 
determine whether the non-signatory may be regarded to have consented impliedly. 
The circumstances in KKO 2013:84 offer little help for this assessment in terms of non-
signatory conduct. Other than disagreeing on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after 
the dispute had arisen, which naturally cannot be taken into account, the non-signatory’s 
conduct only includes the apparent acceptance of the right of redemption granted to it in 
the underlying agreement and invoking the right after it had been breached by the signatory 
party. This apparent acceptance may be deduced from the very fact that the non-signatory 
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invoked the right in a court of law. Moreover, the acceptance may be pinpointed to the 
moment when the non-signatory became aware of the benefit granted to it, assumingly 
when the signatories informed the non-signatory of the right. The timing becomes relevant 
in discussing the offer-reply mechanism below. 
As the acceptance of the right of redemption by the non-signatory is undisputed, the next 
step is to determine the conditions under which the benefit has been accepted. Since there 
are no other indications in the non-signatory’s conduct as to its intent, the grounds for the 
assessment must be looked for elsewhere. In this case, the attention again turns to objective 
interpretation, the “reasonable person” and the justified presumptions accordingly with the 
customary practice and trade usages. 
The grounds for objective interpretation are the same as above: with no indication as to any 
other intent of the non-signatory, employing the notion of a “reasonable person” the 
analysis will determine what the non-signatory should reasonably have expected of the 
benefit granted. Therefore, considering the purpose of arbitration, which is to provide for 
an effective, fast, private and centralized dispute resolution, the presumption of a 
comprehensive arbitration clause may be applied. The premise of a single form of dispute 
resolution may be expected, and a clear indication of this presumption is provided in law as 
well: arbitration excludes litigation.
321
Therefore, if the agreement states that the chosen 
form of dispute resolution is arbitration, the presumption is that it is also the only form of 
dispute resolution. This concept of effectiveness is supported by the pro-arbitration 
presumption, and vice versa. Even if the pro-arbitration presumption was not employed, 
the same result would be supported by other considerations, e.g. the aforementioned 
customary practice as well as good faith. In case the signatory parties’ intent has been to 
establish a single, exhaustive form of dispute resolution, it would be unreasonable and in 
conflict with process economy to permit the non-signatory to abuse the ambiguousness of 
contract wording against their true intent. Therefore, according to a general rule of 
interpretation, presented by Koulu, 
“This rule has been called comprehensive or converging interpretation above. 
Its core idea is that the whole complex of disputes must be directed to the 
same channel of dispute resolution.”322 
                                           
321 See Section 5 of the Finnish Arbitration Act. 
322 See Koulu 2008, p. 186. 
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In conclusion, the objective interpretation clearly seems to support the notion that the non-
signatory in KKO 2013:84 is presumably intended to be bound to arbitration by the 
signatories as “parties cannot lightly be deemed to have knowingly split the complex of 
disputes”323. In becoming aware of the benefit granted to it, the non-signatory may be 
presumed to have also become aware of the other provisions of the agreement, including 
the arbitration clause. Naturally, it may well be that the non-signatory has not in fact 
realized this intent of the signatories. However, the presumption is so obvious and well-
reasoned that a reasonable person should have understood the intent as it is consistent with 
the customary practice. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 6.2, in case the intentions of the 
parties have not been congruent, preference may be given to the intent of the opposing 
party if the other party knew or should have known of this intent. Therefore, in the 
presence of such clear presumption of comprehensive arbitration, the non-signatory should 
have been aware that it is presumably bound by the arbitration clause. Then again, 
naturally the non-signatory is never obligated to accept the benefit on whatever conditions 
– it may reject or attempt to alter the deal. Therefore, the issue may be observed in the light 
of the offer-reply mechanism. 
In case the signatories have intended to bind the non-signatory and objective interpretation 
(in the absence of more suitable indications) strongly supports this presumption of 
comprehensive arbitration, the ultimate question is whether the non-signatory accepted the 
benefit as such. The question will be determined on the basis of the offer-reply mechanism, 
derived from Section 1 of the Finnish Contracts Act, according to which a binding 
agreement is formed by an approving reply given to an offer.
324
 In case the reply suggests 
any alterations to the offer, it is regarded as a rejecting reply and a new counter offer.
325
 
Applying the offer-reply mechanism to the case in question, the benefit granted by the 
signatories to the non-signatory constitutes an offer the moment the non-signatory became 
aware of it, supposedly when the signatories informed the non-signatory of the legal act. 
The question of under what conditions the non-signatory accepted the benefit crystallizes 
in that moment. As discussed above, the non-signatory knew or should have known that 
                                           
323 See ibid. p. 198. 
324 See also Hemmo 2007c, p. 14. Even though the act does not apply to agreements subject to formal 
requirements, the issue at hand is related to but does not intrinsically concern such agreement, which is 
why the underlying idea may be applied to considering whether the non-signatory has accepted the 
benefit as such (see e.g. the Swedish Supreme Court decision NJA 2000, cited in Hemmo 2007a, p. 
100). 
325 See Section 6 of the Finnish Contracts Act. 
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the arbitration clause was meant to bind it – arbitration was a condition to the benefit. The 
determinative factor is therefore whether the non-signatory expressed refusal or 
willingness to alter the deal. As the presumption favors arbitration, the burden of proof of 
showing such refusal lies upon the non-signatory.
326
 However, in KKO 2013:84, there is 
no mention whatsoever of any such stipulation or objection by the non-signatory on the 
arbitration clause before the actualization of the dispute. Therefore, from the perspective of 
the offer-reply mechanism, the signatories made an offer in the form of the right of 
redemption, subject to the arbitration clause, in notifying the non-signatory of the benefit, 
and the non-signatory accepted the benefit as such without making any objections as to the 
terms or conditions, thus accepting it conditionally. In conclusion, the non-signatory 
impliedly consented to the benefit as such. Furthermore, if and when the non-signatory 
wanted to repudiate the arbitration clause, the burden of proof lies upon it. However, since 
no such evidence of refusal or similar has been presented in KKO 2013:84, the non-
signatory is to be deemed bound by the arbitration clause. 
 
6.4 Employing equitable estoppel 
Regardless of the fact that a relatively clear conclusion may be drawn based on the factors 
discussed above, additional support is presented in the form of the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, in one form or another. The essence of this doctrine may be found in the principle 
of venire contra factum proprium
327
 – no one may set himself in contradiction to his own 
previous conduct. As discussed above in Chapter 4.4.5, the underlying fundamental 
conception is that a party may not act inconsistently with his own conduct, which in 
practice means that a third party beneficiary may not choose to accept one provision of an 
agreement and choose not to touch the rest. Therefore, in case the right granted to it is 
subject to certain conditions, these conditions are not elective. 
                                           
326 There are differing views to the question of burden of proof. For example, the Dutch Supreme Court 
stated in its decision in 2006 that subjecting the non-signatory to arbitration requires that “the will of 
the non-signatory to adhere to the arbitration agreement was clear and expressed without doubt”, see 
Hoge Raad (Civil Chamber) 20 January 2006, NJ 2006/77, JOL 2006, 40, RVDW 2006, p. 109, cited in 
Van den Berg 2007, p. 352. However, while agreeing that binding a non-signatory cannot happen 
lightly, the author disagrees with such construction of burden of proof which disregards valid and 
justifiable presumptions concerning arbitration agreements and therefore unnecessarily and to the 
detriment of the signatory hampers the true purpose of the parties by setting needlessly steep 
requirements of evidence, such as “without doubt”. 
327 See Born 2009, p. 1194 
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Diligently employed especially in the United States, the doctrine of equitable estoppel has 
found its place in binding non-signatories to arbitration. For instance, in Hughes Masonry 
Co v. Greater Clark County School Building Corp., the court stated that 
“it would have been "manifestly inequitable" to allow the contractor both to 
claim that the manager was liable for a failure to perform under the terms of 
the contract, and at the same time to deny that the manager was a party to the 
contract in order to avoid arbitration.”328 (emphasis added) 
Incidentally, the non-signatory in KKO 2013:84 asserted that the signatory was liable for a 
failure to perform under the terms of the contract, and at the same time denied that the non-
signatory itself was a party to the contract in order to avoid arbitration. Various other cases 
in the United States have affirmed the notion that a non-signatory who invokes a right 
deriving from a contract is also bound by the dispute resolution clause of said contract.
329
 
Similarly, there are several civil law cases which rely on the same underlying principle, 
although in the form of good faith, venire contra factum proprium or abuse of right.
330
 
Despite the different names on which courts and arbitral tribunals have relied, the 
fundamental principle is still the same. Furthermore, the same principle crystallizes in the 
offer-reply mechanism as well, enabling the receiver of the offer only to accept the whole, 
unaltered offer or otherwise reject it or make a counter-offer. In other words, only picking 
the cherry is not an option. 
Although readily used in case law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does bring forward 
issues which have roused criticism towards the doctrine, its justification and usefulness. 
For instance, as alleged by Rau, 
“it should not matter in the slightest whether the rhetoric is of ‘assumption’ 
or ‘ratification’, or ‘standing in another's shoes’, or ‘condition precedent’ or 
‘estoppel’ – those are nothing but word balloons.”331 (emphasis added) 
                                           
328 See Hughes Masonry Co v. Greater Clark County School Building Corp,. 659 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981) as 
cited in Hanotiau 2006, p. 21. 
329 See e.g. American Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. et al. 
v. Government of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d. 
330 See Born 2009, pp. 1197-1198. See also Hemmo 2007a, pp. 372-373, discussing the meaning of good 
faith as a morale code in the light of the Finnish Contracts Act. 
331 See Rau 2008, p. 238. 
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With this assertion, Rau claims the futility of estoppel and its surrogate role for the real 
tool of binding non-signatories: consent. Parallel to the discussion on finding non-signatory 
consent above, Rau states that the true justification for enforcing arbitration against a non-
signatory (using it as a “sword”) always derives from consent, even in cases where 
equitable estoppel has been employed.
332
 For example, in case the author decided to order 
a fine, well-aged whisky in an ostentatious bar lounge without inquiring the price, he 
would naturally be bound to pay whatever the astronomical check would be. Not because it 
is fair and equitable, but because the author has in fact consented to it. Even better example 
would be if such glass of whisky was brought in front of the author without him ordering 
anything, and he decided to drink it anyway. Similarly, in case the non-signatory in KKO 
2013:84 acknowledged (which it did) that the contract includes an arbitration clause, the 
true justification to bind the non-signatory choosing to invoke its right under the contract 
would not be derived from the notion that it is “equitable” but from the fact that the non-
signatory has knowingly consented to be bound. Naturally, the questions relating to the 
reasonable expectations and the “normal person” rationale would have to be taken into 
account. 
However, even though the author does agree with Rau for the part that consent does play a 
major, if not crucial, role in binding the non-signatory to arbitration, the assertion that 
estoppel is factually “unnecessary window-dressing” or “mere ornamentation” is taking it a 
bit too far.
333
 While consent is indeed necessitated, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does 
have its legal justifications in the notions of good faith and abuse of right, as discussed 
above. Utilizing equitable estoppel works both as a supportive argument to the existence of 
consent and as an independent rule of interpretation. As presented earlier, finding consent 
is eventually a consideration for the courts, based on factual evaluation of the 
circumstances at hand. However, not only is it possible to state that the non-signatory has 
in fact consented to arbitration, but also to acknowledge that the non-signatory beneficiary 
may not dictate which provisions of the contract it will choose to capitalize on and which it 
does not. 
These two different ways of viewing the case do pose an interesting question: does the fact 
that the non-signatory invoking the benefit may not reject the arbitration clause constitute 
consent, or will the consent have to be found independently as well? The question 
                                           
332 See ibid. pp. 239-240. 
333 See ibid. 
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ultimately regresses to the typical chicken or egg dilemma. Fact of the matter is, it matters 
not which comes first in case both support the conclusion that the non-signatory is bound. 
Naturally, it starts to matter in case the view of the Dutch Supreme Court is applied
334
 and 
clear, definite proof is required in order to find non-signatory consent. In such event, 
consent could not be established by stating that the non-signatory was or should have been 
aware of the arbitration clause and invoked its right knowingly and despite the assumption 
that the arbitration clause was meant to bind it. Once again, however, the author disagrees 
on whether it is appropriate or even justifiable to set such thresholds of proof as the 
justifiable expectations provide strong arguments against it. 
In addition, it may be argued that the meaning of equitable estoppel is emphasized 
specifically in non-signatory beneficiary issues, where the non-signatory actually receives 
a benefit as a complete outsider to the agreement. Consent has a bigger role to play in other 
non-signatory issues where the non-signatory is alleged to be bound based on its factual or 
legal status, position or role in negotiations. In comparison, the status of non-signatory 
beneficiaries is different in the sense that they receive a right (often) with no counter-
performance and subject only to the intent of the signatories, in which case the justification 
and considerations of equitable estoppel are highlighted – equitableness does not favour a 
non-signatory who has received the benefit gratuitously. The fact that the fundaments of 
equitable estoppel are completely different to consent is significant. Binding the non-
signatory is based on the fact that the benefit is solely derived from the underlying 
agreement and by invoking it the non-signatory also takes on the “burden” of arbitration. 
As discussed above, this may be deemed to constitute consent, but it should also be enough 
without such deduction. It may well be enough as an independent conclusion. 
After discussing the elements of equitable estoppel, and seeing that the principles of good 
faith, equity and fair dealing as well as duty of loyalty are concerned, the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel may be applied to KKO 2013:84. The doctrine was not invoked in the 
deliberations as an argument per se, not by the Supreme Court nor the parties involved. 
However, the same rationales which are highlighted by the doctrine can be seen in the 
argumentation. 
As opposed to the argument of the non-signatory (C) that the clause granting the right and 
the arbitration clause are completely separate and that it should have been separately stated 
                                           
334 See supra note 326. 
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that the right granted was also subject to arbitration, the main argument of the signatory 
party (B) in its petition for leave of appeal was that right granted to C derives from the 
entire agreement and not just one single clause.
335
 Furthermore, B claimed that the 
arbitration clause covers the entire underlying agreement, and that the agreement shall be 
regarded as an entity. Reading these arguments between the lines, it may be discovered that 
what B is really saying means that the non-signatory may not choose to pick individual 
clauses which it invokes and disregard the rest – the essence of equitable estoppel. It may 
be presented in many different words, but the concept is to always apply the agreement to 
the non-signatory beneficiary as an entirety as intended by the signatories. 
As for the deliberations of the Supreme Court, it is noteworthy how it lists grounds for not 
binding the non-signatory, and yet with an ambiguous rationale ends up deciding that C is 
bound after all. It is possible, perhaps even probable, that there have been additional 
considerations in effect which have not reached the published precedent. One such factor 
may have been the earlier invocation of the arbitration clause by C, which ultimately did 
not lead to arbitration proceedings. However, even though the fact that C had previously 
invoked the arbitration agreement did not constitute an arbitration agreement between B 
and C (as stated by the court), and despite the fact that said invocation did not lead to 
actual arbitration proceedings, the Supreme Court may have deemed the earlier invocation 
of the arbitration clause by the non-signatory to bar it from later denying its applicability. 
Another answer for the question of why the Supreme Court would refuse to present 
thorough arguments as a support for its decision may be found in the national nature of the 
case at hand. The Finnish Supreme Court has to decide cases based on Finnish law and 
principles. Therefore, even though plenty of case law as well as legal literature exist on this 
very subject, the lack thereof in Finland leaves the Supreme Court in a peculiar position. It 
may not be willing to base its decisions on foreign praxis, yet it would be questionable to 
conclude that it has paid no attention to it whatsoever. Since tools to solve the problem are 
readily available across the border, it may be assumed that the Supreme Court has indeed 
used these arguments presented above in its decision-making process. Not to state them 
aloud would not really be a surprise, especially when the Supreme Court seems to dislike 
referring to anything but the law and its own previous decisions. This notion is also 
supported by the fact that the court refused to voice any opinion as to the intent, actions 
                                           
335 “The right of [the non-signatory] derives not from a single clause of the agreement, but the entire 
agreement.” (a non-official translation of the author) 
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and possible consent by conduct of the non-signatory. Consent is in the author’s opinion 
one of the most determinative factors in KKO 2013:84, the dismissal of which could point 
to other such tools used behind the curtain, such as equitable estoppel. Infallible 
conclusions are naturally hard to draw from a decision which gives very little insight to the 
train of thought behind it, but some clarity may be reached with such benefit of hindsight. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
After a thorough evaluation, the author expectedly reaches the same result as the Supreme 
Court: the non-signatory beneficiary is bound by the arbitration clause. However, the 
rationale behind the conclusion is very different. For the sake of clarity, a short 
juxtaposition with the Supreme Court decision is in order. To conclude the analysis, the 
thesis will first discuss the focal issues with the Supreme Court decision after which, 
compiling the conclusions and essential rationales of the previous chapters, an alternative 
way of structuring the case is presented. Lastly, the thesis will present a brief analysis of 
the significance and effect of the Supreme Court decision and propositions for the future 
accordingly. 
 
7.1 Shortcomings of KKO 2013:84 
As discussed above, the rationale behind the Supreme Court decision in KKO 2013:84 is 
basically the following: the non-signatory’s claim necessitates interpretation of the 
underlying agreement (in which the benefit was granted), making it an issue arising out of 
the agreement, which is to be resolved in arbitration. 
As an independent rule of interpretation, this one raises a few questions: first of all, with 
regard to arbitration agreements’ formal requirements and extent in relation to third parties, 
and secondly with regard to situations in which multiple parties are involved in a series of 
contracts. In the first case, the rule provides no insight as to why the arbitration is extended 
to cover the non-signatory or why the formal requirements are dismissed. Even though it is 
now obvious that the written requirement is irrelevant with regard to the non-signatory 
beneficiary, does it mean that the Supreme Court decision construes the requirement the 
same way as the author
336
 or does it also mean that the nature of the requirement has 
changed even between the signatory parties? Although the author assumes the former, it 
might provide an interesting premise for further analysis. 
Be as it may, this lack of reasoning basically leads to literal application of the rule of 
interpretation. Therefore, in the case of multiple parties and series of contracts, if parties X 
and Y had a dispute which was materially linked to another agreement between Y and Z 
                                           
336 I.e. the requirement only applies in the formation of the arbitration agreement between the signatory 
parties. See supra Chapter 5.2.1. 
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containing an arbitration clause, would the dispute have to be brought to arbitration? If the 
rationale of the Supreme Court was applied, the answer would be positive, especially in 
case resolving the dispute would require interpretation of the agreement between Y and Z. 
This view, however, is troublesome due to the fact that it disregards the subjective scope of 
arbitration which has typically only bound the parties of the arbitration agreement. In other 
words, this rationale would place emphasis on the object and the subject matter of the 
dispute. Such interpretation would shift the focus away from party consent and intent 
which have traditionally been the focal elements, at least in the international environment. 
Further concern arises with regard to this problematic interpretation. Would the “easy 
access” to arbitration provided by this view drastically increase objections based on 
jurisdiction? Since it would be so much easier to factually link any case to arbitration with 
this interpretation, it might open a Pandora’s Box of a sort, producing a lot of mala fides 
procedural defences that would not be possible otherwise. This begs the question, has the 
Supreme Court thought its interpretation through? Instead of using an internationally 
accepted rule of interpretation, the court creates a new rule with no clear rationale. Perhaps 
the issue will have to be resolved in the form of another precedent, presenting more 
definite justifications. 
More questions arise with regard to the lower tier court decisions. Even though the 
decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeal have no real legal significance after 
the Supreme Court has given its ruling, those courts managed to address issues which the 
Supreme Court did not. These issues were highlighted in the thesis as it attempted to 
provide legally valid and rational as well as well-reasoned grounds for resolving the 
matter. 
First of all, the question of the requirement of written agreement was admittedly somewhat 
resolved by the Supreme Court, in the sense that obviously it is not an absolute 
requirement. The complete lack of rationale to support this view, however, is puzzling. 
Either the Supreme Court in its progressiveness regarded this notion as truism and 
therefore did not even bother to comment on the subject, except for stating that the non-
existence of a written agreement supports not binding the non-signatory. Alternatively, the 
Supreme Court recognized the need to address the issue, but saw the task of its further 
examination as better suited for commentators of the precedent, such as lowly thesis 
writers. Secondly, the question of whether the signatories can in a legally binding way set a 
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condition to the benefit they are granting is resolved by the Supreme Court decision KKO 
2007:18, the requirement being an express stipulation of such intent. However, with regard 
to the universally acknowledged doctrine of binding a third party beneficiary to arbitration 
without an express stipulation
337
, KKO 2013:84 provides no help. In the light of this 
decision, the question still remains. 
Another deficiency in KKO 2013:84 concerns the status of the non-signatory with respect 
to the arbitration agreement. Introduced above in Chapter 6.1.1, the issue whether the non-
signatory is regarded as an actual party or “merely” bound by it carries some significance. 
First and foremost, the question of enforcement comes to mind. In case a non-signatory 
had insisted and succeeded in joining in on the arbitration, it would have trouble enforcing 
the award abroad as the coverage of the New York Convention only reaches to actual 
parties of the arbitration agreement.
338
 The emphasis of KKO 2013:84 on the subject 
matter of the dispute as the determinative factor seems to imply that the non-signatory 
beneficiary would not be a party. After all, the Supreme Court’s decision practically states 
that no factors favorable to regarding the non-signatory as a party exist, quite on the 
contrary. While the case at hand is undeniably national, the rules and policies governing 
arbitration should not be laid out to impede international arbitration either. Whether this 
issue would actualize often is a different thing, but still leaves one more question open. 
 
7.2 The alternative 
In conclusion and to answer the fourth and last research question, the thesis will briefly 
present the alternative way of resolving the issue in KKO 2013:84 in the light of the 
previous analysis. 
Chronologically following the research questions, the deduction begins by addressing the 
issue of requirement of written arbitration agreement, which, as a premise, would preclude 
arbitration with regard to the non-signatory if the letter of the law was interpreted 
accurately. However, as the argumentation above in Chapter 5.2.1 asserts, the previous 
strict interpretation of the written requirement is ill-suited to the modern business 
environment in which situations including non-signatory parties arise more and more 
                                           
337 See supra Chapter 4.4.4. 
338 See Article II (1) of the New York Convention. 
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frequently. It lacks justification and has widely been replaced by freedom of the parties to 
decide on the form more freely. Furthermore, the more appropriate perception of the 
requirement would apply the strict requirement only to the initial creation of the arbitration 
agreement, not the subsequent determination of its ratione personae. 
Accordingly, after concluding that the letter of section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act 
does not create an obstacle, the deduction moves on to consider whether the signatories 
may validly set arbitration as a condition to the benefit they grant to the non-signatory. As 
stated in Chapter 5.3.2, the signatories do indeed have the right to place such conditions 
because, absent any restrictions by the law, it is essentially a question of freedom of 
contract concerning a unilateral stipulation by the signatories. The question of whether the 
non-signatory is bound is therefore determined by interpreting whether it was the 
signatories’ intention to bind him. 
The next step is to interpret the intent of both the signatories and the non-signatory. 
Discussed in Chapter 6.3.1, the interpretation, in addition to exploring the actual arbitration 
clause, relies heavily on presumptions and objective interpretation. The presumptions 
along with other considerations clearly support the intent of the signatories to bind the non-
signatory. Therefore, in the absence of any proof whatsoever to the contrary, the 
signatories’ intent (as well as the aforementioned right to impose arbitration as an 
accessory) leads to the conclusion that the non-signatory is bound to arbitration. 
Furthermore, addressed by the same (third) research question, the intent of the non-
signatory may be used as a supporting factor as discussed in Chapter 6.3.2. The same 
presumptions and the rationale of a reasonable person obliges to the non-signatory in the 
sense that it should have known it was going to be bound by the arbitration clause in case it 
invoked the right of redemption. Employing the notion of implied consent, the non-
signatory is deemed in fact to have consented to arbitration, therefore becoming an actual 
party to the arbitration. However, it must be highlighted that this obligation to arbitrate 
only actualizes in case the non-signatory wants to enforce the right granted to it in the 
underlying agreement, which also brings us to the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
Applicable as an independent rule, the doctrine relying on good faith dictates that when the 
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non-signatory chooses to invoke its right, it in reality invokes the entire agreement with all 
the terms and conditions applicable to it, such as the arbitration clause.
339
 
 
7.3 Propositions for the future 
The Supreme Court may be commended on its decision in the sense that it was indeed the 
“right” decision concerning the future of arbitration in Finland. When situations including 
non-signatory parties become more frequent, it is important that the arbitration regime, the 
laws and rules of interpretation, are up to date and capable of addressing the needs and 
demands of the environment. However, as discussed above, in addition to presenting no 
real rationales which might be used in future cases, KKO 2013:84 creates a rule of 
interpretation which is troublesome and rather unwieldy as an independent rule. Since the 
crucial factor in arbitration is essentially consensuality, there is rarely need to revert to 
legal tools other than those which employ party consent. One such exception is equitable 
estoppel, the doctrine which in itself is unfamiliar in our legal environment, but the 
fundaments and rationales of which can still be found deeply rooted in Finland. As for 
consent, it is true that this approach of dealing with non-signatory issues would emphasize 
the role of courts or arbitral tribunals because discovering consent is typically a matter of 
interpretation of factual circumstances, e.g. in determining implied consent. Then again, 
the author sees no difficulties with this approach – what better way to adapt to a variety of 
situations than a pliant rule of interpretation. Moreover, as for equitable estoppel, the 
essence of the doctrine does not require such fact oriented interpretation; it is applicable in 
a more straightforward manner. 
The requirement of written agreement, as imposed in Section 3 of the Finnish Arbitration 
Act, was an essential question in the thesis. Even though the non-existence of a written 
agreement was ultimately not an issue with regard to the non-signatory, the fact remains 
that, if interpreted accurately and “by the book”, the provision would effectively prevent 
binding any non-signatories.
340
 Therefore, following the universal trend of gradual 
liberalization – countries giving up the requirement in form – the written requirement of 
Section 3 could be revisited. In addition, an alternative for entirely giving up the formal 
                                           
339 See Hosking 2004a, p. 292: ”the third party beneficiary is only bound to arbitrate where it is the 
claimant in a claim relying on the main agreement”. 
340 See supra Chapter 5.2. 
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requirement, yet less progressive, would be redefining the application of the written form 
by elaborating how it is to be viewed and used. The case of non-signatory beneficiaries, for 
instance, craves for clear instructions on the usage of the section. For instance, revising the 
section to include a specific subsection which clarifies non-signatory issues is a possibility. 
Elaborating how the section is to be interpreted in the travaux préparatoires is another. 
Then again, this option would still leave the door closed for oral agreements. 
All in all, in the author’s opinion there is no reason to impose excessively rigid conditions 
to the formation of arbitration agreements where none exist for other types of agreements. 
The view regarding arbitration as an anomaly or danger to due process has become 
obsolete and can no longer be considered as a justification for the requirement in form of 
the law. Instead, the purpose of the formal requirement could be replaced with a “high 
contractual threshold” as is done in Sweden.341 Setting definite standards of clarity and 
unambiguousness would help reaching the same result, but in a manner that is more pliant 
and user friendly. In this option, emphasis would be placed on evidentiary matters. This, 
however, is rather irrelevant since such emphasis already exists on any other types of 
agreements. Therefore, giving up the requirement of written form completely, as an idea, 
might be contemplated on as well. For instance, the author, in the light of the rationales 
above, sees no justification in preserving the requirement. The actualization of this 
suggestion in practice is another thing. 
With regard to the internationally recognized tools of binding third parties to arbitration
342
, 
some of them are naturally available for use in Finland, such as implied consent or matters 
of agency or transfer of contract. However, even though binding third party beneficiaries 
may be supported with other considerations as well, acknowledging it as an independent 
rule of interpretation would help in avoiding insufficiently justified decisions such as KKO 
2013:84. The doctrine clearly has a solid ground, good justifications as well as flexibility 
needed for the variety of different situations which are bound to arise. Furthermore, the 
recognition thereof requires no factual action on behalf of the legislator, even a well 
justified precedent would suffice. 
As for the doctrine of equitable estoppel, its theoretical significance and obvious suitability 
to KKO 2013:84 as well as its possible influence between the lines of the Supreme Court’s 
                                           
341 See Hobér 2011, pp. 90-91. 
342 As presented above in Chapter 4.4. 
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deliberations (as discovered above) brings forward the question of whether it could be 
embraced more openly in the Finnish legal system. Even when the references to it in KKO 
2013:84 are relatively open to interpretation, it does diminish the significance of the 
existing foundations thereof. Naturally, this thought may be criticized by invoking the fact 
that it is of Anglo-American origin, it is mostly used in common law countries or that it has 
not been actively employed (as such) in other civil law countries either. However, these 
arguments disregard the fact that the doctrine is already essentially embedded in the civil 
law system, if only in other forms, such as good faith, the offer-reply mechanism or the 
duty of loyalty towards the other party. Then again, it may be further questioned whether a 
completely new doctrine is needed since similar tools already exist. In the author’s 
opinion, adopting the doctrine as a complete legal transplant would not be necessary. 
However, the lack of court decisions employing deliberations which gave relevance to the 
underlying notion of equitable estoppel, good faith, is apparent. Simply put, despite the 
existence of such tools, they are not readily used in contemporary Finnish case law. The 
aforementioned embracing of the doctrine could and should therefore occur in the form of 
acknowledging the integral foundations thereof. Moreover, the fact that these foundations 
may be distinguished in the background of KKO 2013:84 – even if it does not transpire 
from the actual published decision – is an indication of the possibility to recognize their 
existence more openly. 
Finally, the role of consent may be evaluated. In 2011, Hanotiau posed the question of 
whether there is a marginalization of consent in international arbitration.
343
 In the light of 
KKO 2013:84, the same question may be presented again. Consent, any determinations (or 
lack thereof) or the very little significance given to it in the decision seems to suggest that 
the Supreme Court does not share the author’s fondness of the simplicity and usefulness of 
the concept of consent and its use in non-signatory issues. However, in foreign case law, 
consent seems to be the backbone of binding non-signatories to which courts, arbitrators 
and scholars alike often tend to lean on. Moreover, as stated above, the peculiar lack of 
reasoning by the Supreme Court could suggest that there have in fact been other factors 
behind the rationale of the decision which, in its current form, seems to have come out of 
thin air. As asserted above, one such factor might be equitable estoppel, but one could also 
be the actualization of non-signatory consent. 
                                           
343 See Hanotiau 2011, pp. 553-554. 
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However, it must be noted that deliberately leaving out any references to consent in case 
the Supreme Court actually regarded consent to exist would be rather strange. After all, it 
would have been a rationale completely based on national legislation and legal principles. 
This seems to point back to the idea that the rationale behind the decision has been 
something else, or perhaps the Supreme Court has simply attempted to create a new rule of 
interpreting arbitration agreements. Either way, the author still considers consent as the 
most pragmatic and easily applicable legal tool with regard to binding non-signatories to 
arbitration. Therefore, for the sake of development of arbitration in Finland, where no 
practical (or theoretical) need for creating new, perplexing rules of interpretation exists, the 
recommendable option would be to refrain from such ventures and instead employ the 
justifiable, universally acknowledged and, before all, working rules and methods. 
Moreover, regardless of whether the legislator and the Supreme Court wish to employ tools 
commonly used in foreign case law and legal literature or the tools which already exist in 
Finland, the essential objective is ultimately to have clear, unambiguous rules which all 
operators on the field of arbitration may rely on. 
